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Abstract 
 
  The United States Air Force (USAF) is currently experiencing a period of high 
operations tempo and overseas deployments have become frequent.  These deployments 
will leave home installations short manned.  Some amount of risk is incurred by the home 
installation as a result of the short manning.  For an organization, such as an USAF Fire 
and Emergency Services (FES) flight, whose primary responsibility is the protection of 
life and property, the incurred risk could be catastrophic.  Still no attempt has been made 
to quantify risk in terms of manpower for USAF FES flights. 
  The primary purpose of this research was to develop and validate a methodology 
to quantify risk in terms of manpower for FES flights.  This research develops a decision 
tool to provide insight to FES Fire Chiefs on the risk associated with specific manpower 
decisions.  The methodology was validated using data from Dyess Air Force Base FES 
flight.  A secondary goal of the research was to determine a cost/benefit relationship 
between the risk level and the cost to backfill deployed firefighter positions with contract 
labor.  The result was a decision tree model and pareto optimal graphs for the risk to 
manpower level and the cost/benefit relationship. 
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QUANTIFICATION OF RISK FOR USAF FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES 
FLIGHTS AS A RESULT OF SHORTAGES IN MANPOWER 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
Background 
 Emergency services play a vital role in the safety of a community as the first 
responders to emergency or potential emergency events.  In this role of first responders, 
emergency services personnel are expected to maintain a certain level of public safety 
and minimize the material costs of an incident.  Each day emergency services’ decision 
makers are faced with manpower decisions.  Most of these manpower decisions are 
intended to minimize cost while keeping risk at an acceptable level.  This decision can be 
made tougher by manpower absences, both scheduled and unscheduled, because the role 
first responders serve for the community still exists.  United States Air Force (USAF) 
Fire and Emergency Services (FES) flights have the same manpower concerns as civilian 
emergency services, but they are also faced with some manpower concerns unique to 
military organizations.  One unique concern is supporting worldwide deployments.  
These deployments may be known in advance or may come with little warning.  
Deployments can create tough manpower decisions for USAF fire chiefs and leadership.   
In most municipalities there are three main services first responders provide.  
These services are fire department, police department and emergency medical services.  
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The New York Police Department (2007) defines its mission as “to enhance the quality of 
life in our City by working in partnership with the community and in accordance with 
constitutional rights to enforce the laws, preserve the peace, reduce fear, and provide for 
a safe environment.”  Brotcorne et al. (2003) defined emergency medical services as 
providing emergency medical treatment or paramedics for a variety of medical situations.  
Webster (2007) provides a basic definition of a fire department as “an organization for 
preventing or extinguishing fires.”  However, in many cases the role of the fire 
department is much greater than that definition.  The USAF, in Air Force Instruction 
(AFI) 32-2001 (1999), defines the mission of an FES flight to be: 
The mission of Air Force Fire Protection is to provide fire and emergency 
services to prevent and minimize losses to Air Force lives, property, and 
the environment occurring in periods of peace, war, military operations 
other-than-war, and humanitarian support operations. These include both 
man-made and natural incidents requiring fire protection, rescue, 
hazardous material, and emergency medical responses  
 
The USAF definition is similar to other fire department definitions.  This definition 
creates a situation where the fire department is a responder to almost all emergency 
responses outside of normal law enforcement responses.  As of late, emergency services 
have been tested even more with monumental natural disasters and a growing population.  
In addition, emergency services have seen their responsibilities increase as the emphasis 
on homeland security increases.  The Fire Reshaping Conference (2006) suggested the 
final sentence of the mission be changed to: 
Included are both man-made and natural incidents; fire suppression or 
hazard mitigation; rescue; mitigation or containment of releases of 
hazardous materials, such as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or 
explosive (CBRNE) agents, resulting from industrial accidents, terrorism, 
or weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and emergency medical 
services… 
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In addition to having the same problems as the municipalities, FES flights also have 
responsibilities to the Global War on Terror and other USAF overseas operations. 
The USAF experiences a continual cycle of overseas deployments as part of the 
Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF).  Jumper (2005) states the AEF consists of ten 
combat units that are deployed for 120 days every 20 months.  The AEF cycle 
temporarily relocates airmen from their home installations to forward operating bases.  
However, some specific units or entire combat units may be required to deploy longer 
than 120 days or more frequently than every 20 months (Jumper, 2005).  The AEF cycle 
can lead to a manpower shortage at home installations, creating an increased risk to the 
home installation’s mission.  The effect on the mission is particularly evident when 
analyzing public safety flights such as USAF FES flights.  FES flights are still required to 
maintain adequate home installation coverage to sustain the mission throughout the 
deployment. 
Air Force Manpower Standard (AFMS) 44EF (1996) currently governs the 
manpower level in FES flights.  The standard creates a baseline FES manpower standard 
package which is defined for manpower and equipment.  The FES manpower baseline is 
55 firefighters with the exception of six bases with special or reduced responsibilities.  
According to AFI 32-2001 (1999), manpower levels are to be based on the assumption 
that only one major aircraft, structural, or hazardous material incident will occur 
simultaneously.  AFMS 44EF (1996) was established to provide enough manpower to 
support wartime and peacetime, however, manpower is not adjusted based on the actual 
manpower deployment rates at an installation.   
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AFMS 44EF (1996) states manpower and equipment will be either added or subtracted in 
accordance with the following items:   
1. Fire Flow Demand (In intervals of 3,000 gallons per minute demand) 
2. Minimum Response Times Cannot be Met 
3. Installations with Permanently Assigned Large Aircraft (Over 175 feet in 
Length) 
4. Installations with Auxiliary Flying Fields 
5. Installations with Gunnery/Bomb Range or Offsite Weapon Storage 
6. Installations without Flying Missions 
7. Installations with Large Land Areas are Authorized Additional Fire Inspectors 
Note:  Major Commands (MAJCOM) can request additional firefighters if they determine 
there is a large enough presence of aircraft not permanently assigned to the installation to 
require such an action. 
In order to keep the home installation mission operational during times of 
deployments, FES flights are requiring personnel to work overtime and/or hiring 
contractors to backfill the shortfalls.  This can be at great expense with civilian overtime 
or contractor labor and lead to retention problems and lowered morale for the military 
firefighters (FES Reshaping Conference, 2006).  However, understaffing an FES shift can 
also have negative consequences.  Understaffing can cause loss of life or property and 
ultimately result in either mission failure or stoppage.  Because of the severity of the 
consequences, it is important to understand the risk created to a base prior to deployment 
of its airmen. 
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 During times of short manning, FES fire chiefs are required to develop an 
installation commander-approved risk assessment.  AFI 32-201 (1999) states a risk 
assessment is necessary when an FES flight does not meet Department of Defense, Air 
Force, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), or National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) standards.  AFI 90-901 (2000), Air Force Pamphlet 
(AFPAM) 90-902 (2000), and Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-9 (2000) give basic 
guidance on operational risk assessments, but these do not limit the subjectivity of the 
analysis.  In addition, a matrix developed by Air Combat Command (ACC), relates 
manpower level to impact.  However, this matrix, depicted in Table 1.1, is not installation 
specific and may not be applicable to deployment situations. 
Problem Statement 
 This research developed the methodology for a decision tool to allow FES fire 
chiefs to quantitatively analyze the risk associated with manpower shortage situations 
caused by deployments.  Existing risk assessment methodology was modified as 
necessary to assess the risks at different manpower levels.  In addition to quantitatively 
comparing risk, the cost/benefit associated with the manpower levels was analyzed.  In 
the process, a collectively exhausted list of risk scenarios and their associated likelihood 
and consequence will be developed.  USAF installations have a unique mission and 
therefore, may have a unique set of risks.  Because of the unique set a risks, a specific 
location, Dyess Air Force Base (AFB), was chosen to validate the model.  
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Table 1.1:  ACC Matrix Relating Manpower Level to Impact (Kennedy, 2007) 
Home-Station Staffing and Capability During Deployment 
STAFFING % IMPACTS 
100% Fire Department is fully staffed-fully capable  
95% 
90%  
FULLY 
CAPABLE 
FIRE DEPARTMENT IMPACT:  Begin draw down of 
management positions.  Shift personnel will begin to perform duties 
assigned to now vacant positions.  EMERGENCY SCENE 
IMPACT:  Reasonable expectation firefighting forces will be 
successful at performing aircraft fire/rescue, structural response, 
emergency medical support, hazmat operations, Homeland Defense 
(HLD) requirements and other related functions.  
85% 
INCREASED 
RISK 
FIRE DEPARTMENT IMPACT:  Further draw down of 
management.  Essential management functions such as fire 
prevention/public education and training are curtailed.  Management 
of fire protection flight functions begins to suffer without full time 
staff.   Staffing variances are eliminated resulting in cross manning of 
vehicles.  Reduce staffing assigned to each vehicle.  Reduce staffing 
or completely close auxiliary flying fields and outlying fire stations.  
Firefighters work additional hours and leave begins to be affected.  
EMERGENCY SCENE IMPACT:  Interior/exterior rescue or fire 
suppression capability is severely limited.  Firefighting forces can still 
be expected to fight and control exterior fires.  Firefighter safety is 
impacted, attempted rescue of trapped personnel severely endangers 
rescuers.  Crew rehabilitation and firefighting re-supply capabilities 
are limited, sustained operations capability is restricted.  HLD 
capability is limited.  
75% 
SEVERE RISK 
IMPACT:  Response capability is severely impacted; firefighter 
safety is at a higher level or risk.  Long-term impacts are significant 
70%  
CRITICAL 
RISK 
65% 
60% 
FIRE DEPARTMENT IMPACT:  Firefighters can expect to work 
extra hours and have all leave cancelled.  To keep all available 
firefighters on vehicles, all mandatory appointments must be 
conducted off duty.  Individual workloads increase greatly to cover 
responsibilities of vacant management positions.  Morale is greatly 
affected by loss of leave, increased workload, and off duty 
appointments.  EMERGENCY SCENE IMPACT:  Single event 
limited response capability; flying activities may be limited or 
curtailed.  Only limited exterior fire suppression can be performed.  
Responses will be significantly delayed.  Rescue of trapped personnel 
should not be expected.  HLD capability is inadequate  
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Research Objectives and Questions 
Currently, when an FES flight has a manpower shortfall, the responsibility of 
determining the proper manpower level falls on the fire chief, the fire marshal, and the 
installation commander.  The primary objective of this research was to create a 
methodology for a decision tool, using both historical data and qualitative expert opinion, 
which allows fire chiefs to quantitatively represent the change in risk in terms of 
manpower levels.  The intention was not to create a model that recommends a solution, 
but rather provide a series of pareto optimal graphs for risk and cost/benefit, that provide 
insight and support to fire chiefs.  Although the methodology was tested at Dyess AFB, 
the objective is to create a methodology that is applicable to the all USAF FES flights.  In 
the process of validating the model, the accuracy of some USAF assumptions about 
manpower were examined.   
Methodology 
The primary research objective was to create a methodology for a risk-based 
decision tool for fire chiefs.  In order to develop this methodology, certain steps were 
followed.  The first step was to use historical and qualitative data to perform a risk 
assessment in accordance with Kaplan and Garrick (1981) and other available literature.  
The risk will then be aggregated for each manpower level and a series of pareto optimal 
graphs will be created.  The second step was to determine the cost associated with the 
manpower levels and graph the cost/benefit relationship.  The third step was to perform 
sensitivity analysis to determine the effect changes in uncertain values had on the 
analysis.  The final step was to compare results with those of the manpower standards and 
assumptions. 
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This methodology was chosen for various reasons.  The results must serve as a quick 
reference for fire chiefs.  Deployments can occur with very little warning and there may 
not be the time to complete a complex risk analysis.  The results must be presented in a 
manner that is not only operable to fire chiefs, but can be understood by fire marshals and 
installation commanders.  FES manpower decisions are made by these three people and 
therefore, the results need to be operable to all of them.  The final reason these steps were 
chosen is it simplifies the problem without sacrificing the validity.  This allows the 
analysis to be accomplished using data and expertise readily available to installation Fire 
Chiefs.   
Significance to the Air Force 
This study will help Fire Chiefs better quantify risk.  It will also help USAF decision 
makers (DM) choose deployment manpower strategies based on cost/benefit analysis.  In 
deployment situations, FES flights are asked to keep the same level of coverage with less 
manpower.  This methodology will allow leadership to reference a document that 
quantitatively compares risk and the cost/benefit relationship associated with manpower 
decision.  Ultimately the results will help leadership manage costs while avoiding 
unnecessary risks. 
Summary of Remaining Document 
Emergency services are faced with tough manpower decisions on a daily basis.  
USAF FES flights face these same tough decisions, but also have to be concerned with 
manpower shortages created by deployments.  Their decision attempts to balance cost 
with risk.  This research developed a methodology to quantitatively analyze the risk and 
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the cost/benefit of the decision.  The test case for this methodology was the FES flight at 
Dyess AFB. 
This document has four remaining chapters.  Chapter 2 is a literature review, which 
will discuss the main concepts and previous uses in the literature.  Chapter 3 discusses the 
methodology and model used to determine the risk and cost associated with a shortage of 
manpower in a FES flights.  Chapter 4 applies and tests the methodology discussed in 
Chapter 3 on the Dyess AFB test case.  Chapter 5 discusses the results of the Dyess AFB 
case, shortfalls, and areas of future research. 
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II.  Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
The United States Air Force (USAF) calls risk analysis and management, 
Operational Risk Management (ORM).  The purpose of ORM is to increase the ability of 
the USAF to carry out the mission in both peacetime and wartime (AFPD 90-9, 2000).  
“The four guiding principles of ORM are: 1) accept no unnecessary risk, 2) make risk 
decisions at the appropriate level, 3) accept risk when benefits outweigh the costs, and 4) 
integrate ORM into operations and planning at all levels.”  (AFPD 90-9, 2000:1)  The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide literature background on the areas pertinent to risk 
analysis and management research.  It provides an overview of risk analysis, decision 
analysis, decision trees, influence diagrams, and manpower.  In addition, it provides some 
insight into the USAF Fire and Emergency Service (FES) flights’ responsibilities 
regarding risk analysis.  In this document, the term FES flight was used to represent a 
USAF FES flight unless otherwise denoted.  In order to study risk a definition of risk was 
developed first. 
Background on Risk 
 Risk has been defined many ways in the literature and for many different 
situations.  Frohwein et al. (1999) described risk as “a family of measures of the 
probability and severity of adverse effects.”  This definition lacks any mention of the 
causes of the adverse effects.  Hirschler (1992) defined risk specifically for fire scenarios.  
Fire risk is “a measure of fire loss (life, health, animals, or property) that combines (a) the 
potential for harm in the various fire scenarios that can occur and (b) the probabilities of 
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occurrence of those scenarios, within a specified period, in a defined occupancy or 
situation.”  (Hirschler, 1992)  This definition is valid if the risk of fire was the only 
concern, but FES flights’ responsibilities include much more than just fighting and 
preventing fires.  However, Hirschler did include an important detail other authors have 
not included in their definition.  Hirschler stated risk should be analyzed over a “specific 
period” and a “defined occupancy.”  This research used a “specific period,” one day, and 
a “defined occupancy,” Dyess AFB.  The USAF defines risk as “the probability and 
severity of loss or adverse impact from exposure to various hazards.”  (AFI 90-901, 
2000)  The USAF definition makes the assumption that a “hazard” will occur.  The 
definition used for this study was a combination of Hirschler (1992) and AFI 90-901 
(2000).  Risk is defined as the likelihood of an occurrence of a Fire and Emergency 
Services scenario and the associated loss over a specific period and a defined occupancy.   
To make the risk definition useful to a decision maker, risk must often be 
quantified.  In this research, Quantitative Risk Assessment or Analysis (QRA) was used 
to quantify risk (Apostolakis, 2004).  In QRA, risk can be determined from three basic 
questions 1) What can go wrong?, 2) How likely is it?, and 3) What are the 
consequences?  These questions translate risk into a function of all the risk scenarios (Si) 
(Kaplan and Garrick, 1981).  Each of these risk scenarios is quantified with a likelihood 
(Li), and consequence (Xi) (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981).  The concept of risk as a function 
of the risk scenarios is the basic foundation, but many different approaches to QRA have 
been developed. 
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Risk Analysis and Management 
The QRA methods differ in approach, but they are all intended to find a set of risk 
scenarios and the scenario’s associated likelihood and consequence.  One approach is to 
examine the consequences first.  An example of the consequence-first approach is 
Apostolakis’ (2004) five-step approach, which is based on determining what bad can 
happen and then finding the risk scenarios that create those consequences.    Apostolakis’ 
(2004) five evaluation steps are: 1) create a list of “undesirable end states,” 2) determine 
“initiating events” (IE), 3) identify the sequence of events to create “accident scenarios,” 
4) determine the probability of the scenarios, 5) rank the scenarios in terms of frequency.  
Apostolakis also stated that peer review of the process is an important step.  Another 
approach to QRA is to determine the risk scenarios first.  The USAF proposed 
accomplishing this through a six-step process.  The six steps are:  1) identify risk 
scenarios, 2) aggregate consequences with likelihood to determine risk, 3) analyze to see 
the effects of risk avoidance, mitigation, or acceptance, 4) make appropriate decisions 
based on analysis in step 3, 5) implement appropriate decision, and 6) manage the risk 
throughout the life of the risk (AFPAM 90-902, 2000).   
The consequence-first and the risk scenario-first approaches are useful in 
generating the list of risk scenarios.  However, both of these models fall short of the 
desired result of this research.  The approach proposed by Apostolakis (2004) is focused 
on simply ranking risk.  The concept of this research was the aggregation of risk and 
mitigation of risk by using manpower, not simply a rank order.  The AFPAM 90-902 
(2000) approach is based on determining various mitigation options.  For this research 
only one mitigation option, manpower, was considered.   
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The five-step approach proposed by Haimes (2004) is a risk scenario-first 
approach.  It was chosen because the approach includes risk modeling, aggregation, and 
trade of risk.  The purpose of this research was to analyze risk, therefore, only the first 
three steps were addressed.  Steps four and five are the responsibility of the decision 
maker (DM).  Haimes’ (2004) five steps are:  1) identify risk scenarios, 2) quantify and 
model the likelihood and consequences, 3) evaluate the risks by aggregation or trade offs, 
4) make appropriate decisions about the risk, and 5) execute decisions and manage 
feedback.   
Determining Risk Scenarios 
The first step in Haimes (2004) QRA approach is determining a set of risk 
scenarios.  Developing a list of scenarios can be challenging, especially in areas like FES 
flights where there are a wide range of responsibilities.  “Finding scenarios is part science 
and a large part art” (Kaplan, 1997).  Some of the difficulty is created by the requirement 
that risk scenarios “be (1) complete, (2) finite, and (3) disjoint.”  (Kaplan et al., 2001)  In 
general, there are three basic ways to determine risk scenarios.  The first two, 
consequence-first (Apostolakis, 2004) and scenario-first (AFPAM 90-902, 2000; Haimes, 
2004), were discussed earlier.  The third method is to start in the middle.  Kaplan (1997) 
stated the process can be started in the middle, in between the initiating event and the 
consequence, and worked in both directions.  There are various techniques for 
accomplishing scenario generation. 
The first examples of risk scenario generation techniques are processes using 
hierarchical approaches.  Examples of techniques that use hierarchical modeling are the 
analytic hierarchy approach, or AHP (Vaidya and Kumar, 2006), risk ranking and 
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filtering or, RRF (Haimes, 2004), and hierarchical holographic modeling, or HHM 
(Haimes et al., 2002).  One of the unique characteristics of HHM is the list of risk 
scenarios is not intended to be disjoint (Kaplan et al. 2001).  Other examples of risk 
scenario generation approaches are approaches that simply make a list by asking experts 
a simple question.  Examples of this are asking what can go wrong, (Kaplan and Garrick, 
1981) and TRIZ, which asks, “If I wanted to make something go wrong, how would I do 
it?” (Kaplan, 1997).  There are other approaches to scenario generation, see Kaplan et al. 
(2001) for additional methods. 
In many situations the list of risk scenarios can be a large, virtually infinite list.  
Kaplan and Garrick (1981) addressed this by defining Si, not as a list of individual 
scenarios, but rather a list of “categories of scenarios.”  This research used Kaplan and 
Garrick’s (1981) categorical approach to scenario generation.  The FES Reshaping 
Conference (2006) developed a list of FES responsibilities.  The categories of scenarios 
were developed from this list.  An additional “Other” category was added.  The “Other” 
category consisted of all the risk scenarios not already included in the categories (Kaplan 
and Garrick, 1981).  This approach ensured a complete, finite, and manageable list of 
scenarios or categories.  The actual category generation is discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 3.  Once the scenarios were generated, the likelihood and consequence of each 
scenario was determined. 
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Determining Likelihood 
 Developing the likelihood of a risk scenario has been accomplished using 
numerous approaches.  Three such approaches are subjective, objective, and objective 
mathematical approaches.  All three of the methods have positive and negative aspects 
and many times multiple approaches are used in a risk analysis.  The approaches have 
been used in the literature in several areas including risk analysis. 
Subjective likelihood is determined by eliciting expert opinion, logical inference, 
or observation.  Subjective likelihood allows analysis of areas where data is not available, 
like Keeny and Winterfeldt’s (1994) analysis of a nuclear repository 100 years in the 
future. In addition, subjective likelihood can be used where historical data is determined 
to be a poor representation of future occurrences (Korte, 2003).  One example of 
subjective approach is the use of pair-wise comparisons of risk scenarios.  AHP uses pair-
wise comparisons to determine likelihood by soliciting experts to determine the 
likelihood of a risk scenario in comparison with the likelihood of the remaining risk 
scenarios (Dey and Mukherjee, 2005).  Expert opinion or subject matter experts are also 
used to develop likelihood.  Korte (2003) used expert opinion to determine the likelihood 
of a safe landing in a helicopter experiencing vibrations.  However, expert opinion may 
vary from expert to expert.  Winterfeldt and O’Sullivan (2006) used a range to represent 
the likelihood for risk scenarios when analyzing the need to protect commercial airlines 
from surface-to-air missile attack.   
Objective probabilities are those that are measured using historical data, 
mathematical process, or another accepted scientific process.  A historical approach to 
likelihood uses occurrences of a scenario in the past to predict occurrences in the future.  
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Historical approaches are used commonly when the environment or process leading to the 
scenario remains relatively unchanged.  Peck and Kavet (2005) used historical data to 
predict likelihood of a child developing leukemia.   
Mathematical distributions are another objective method used to determine 
likelihood.  These distributions can be continuous or discrete distributions.  Cox et al. 
(2005) used the binomial distribution to estimate the likelihood of detecting disease in 
cattle.  Other examples are the exponential, normal, gamma distributions.  See Trueman 
(1974) and Berger and Zeng (2006) for more information on the application of 
continuous and discrete distribution. 
For this research another mathematical distribution, the Poisson distribution, was 
used to estimate likelihood.  Clemen and Reilly (2001) stated the Poisson distribution is 
good “for representing occurrences of a particular event over time and space.”  In other 
words the Poisson distribution is used to represent an event or “scenario” over time or a 
“specified time” and a space or “defined occupancy.”  The Poisson distribution was 
chosen because of its relevance to the risk definition used.  However, Clemen and Reilly 
(2001) stated a “scenario” has to meet four criteria for the Poisson distribution to be 
valid.  The four criteria are: 1) the scenario “can happen at any number of places within 
the” defined occupancy; 2) the likelihood of an event is small at any given point; 3) 
scenarios are independent; and 4) the average number of scenarios does not change over 
the defined occupancy or the specified time.  Kolesar and Walker (1973) used the 
Poisson distribution to estimate fire alarm occurrence over specified regions in New York 
City.  Risk scenarios and likelihood have been defined.  The final variable is 
consequence.
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Determining Consequences 
Kaplan and Garrick (1981) define a consequence for risk as “some kind of loss or 
damage received.”  In terms of risk, a consequence is negative outcome of a risk scenario.  
The USAF considers three consequences in risk analysis:  (a) the threat to the mission 
capability, (b) potential casualties and loss of life, and  (c) loss of property (AFPAM 90-
902).  Similar to the USAF, Winterfeldt and O’Sullivan (2006) use monetary loss of 
property, monetary loss to the industry, loss of life, and cost of maintenance as 
consequences.  In some cases, risk is a function of one consequence.  Korte (2003) 
assumes only one consequence, loss of life, is a factor in a pilot’s decision to ditch a 
helicopter or attempt to fly it to a safe landing zone.  The consequences used in this study 
were total cost to include property loss and response cost and loss of lives. 
Modeling Techniques 
 A variety of different techniques have been developed for performing QRA.  
Many of these techniques use a hierarchical approach to QRA.  An example of a 
hierarchical approach is risk ranking and filtering (RRF).  RRF is a technique developed 
by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration consisting of a hierarchical 
approach to scenario generation, quantification of the scenarios, a filtering process, and 
then ranking of the scenarios.  RRF led to the development of risk filtering, ranking, and 
management (RFRM) (Haimes, 2004).  RFRM uses hierarchical holographic modeling 
(HHM) to generate risk scenarios, but unlike RRF, the scenarios undergo a filtering 
process before quantification.  Additionally, management and feedback steps have been 
included in RFRM (Haimes et al., 2002).  RFRM and HHM have been used in many 
different risk assessments including prioritizing structures for protection against terrorist 
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attacks by Leung et al. (2004).  For other examples see Haimes et al. (2002) and Haimes 
(2004).  One of the methods HHM uses to filter scenarios is pair-wise comparison.   
Another method that relies heavily on pair-wise comparisons is the analytic 
hierarchy process (AHP).  AHP is a method of developing a hierarchy to represent a 
decision and analyzing the hierarchy through a series of pair-wise comparisons.  After the 
pair-wise comparisons have been analyzed, the problem can then be analyzed as 
demonstrated by the application to risks in project management shown in Dey and 
Mukherjee (2005).  AHP differs from many other hierarchical approaches because often, 
the desired result is not just a ranked list of scenarios, but rather an aggregate value for 
risk.   
Computer simulation models are generally intended to produce an aggregate value 
for risk.  Olofsson and Blennow (2005) used computer simulation to identify factors that 
increase the probability of damage to spruce trees.  Another example of computer a 
simulation technique is Monte Carlo simulation.  Monte Carlo simulation is used to 
calculate an outcome distribution for uncertain events with continuous distributions.  It 
produces the outcome by picking a random number within the range of probability of an 
uncertain event and assigns that number to that uncertain event.  This simulation is 
repeated and eventually results in an outcome distribution (Dillon and Haimes, 1996).  
Pires et al. (2005) used a computer based risk algorithm to predict the room of origin for 
a fire.   
In addition to quantitative risk analysis (QRA) there is also qualitative risk 
analysis.  Mulvhill (1988) performed risk analysis using two qualitative risk approaches, 
hazard and operability (HAZOP) analysis and fault trees, and two quantitative analysis 
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methods, event sequence diagrams and event trees.  The analysis was performed and the 
pros and cons of the techniques were compared.  Laughlin (2005) proposed a new 
qualitative risk analysis technique called comparative risk analysis (CRA) for creating 
policy for fire plans.  Many quantitative and qualitative techniques were examined, but it 
was decided the best modeling technique for this research was decision analysis (DA).   
Decision Analysis 
 Decision analysis is a process to break down and analyze a complex decision.  
This analysis is intended to provide insight to the decision maker (DM) that will help the 
DM to consistently make a good decision.  DA does not, however, attempt to make the 
decision for the DM.  It is simply a method to provide structure to the process (Clemen 
and Reilly, 2001).  Kirkwood (1997) proposed that part of DA is to provide more 
justification for a decision.  Therefore, a quantitative approach should be used in 
decision-making.  In order to quantify a decision, Kirkwood (1997) defined three parts: 
the alternatives, the consequences, and uncertainty.  These parts correlate directly to the 
three variables of risk analysis (risk scenarios, consequences, and likelihood), which 
made DA a very effective technique in quantifying risk.  Clemen and Reilly (2001) 
defined a specific process in DA shown on Figure 2.1.  Other literature has slightly 
different verbiage to describe the decision making process, but the results are the same 
(Kirkwood, 1997; Raiffa, 1968; Trueman 1974). 
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Figure 2.1:  Clemen and Reilly (2001) Decision Analysis Process 
 
 
 Uncertainty plays an important role in a decision.  If everything is known about a 
decision, then the decision making process is trivial.  However, it is rare to know 
everything about a decision (Trueman, 1974).  There are two types of uncertainty in 
decisions, objective and subjective.  When analyzing decisions, it may not always be 
possible or practical to obtain objective probabilities.  Therefore, subjective probabilities 
must be used (Haimes, 2004).  The analysis in this research used both objective and 
subjective probabilities as part of the model. 
 The literature includes some skeptics regarding the applicability of traditional DA 
in dynamic situations, such as the response to specific emergency situations.  Klein and 
Calderwood (1991) argued that in a dynamic situation the DM does not have adequate 
time to use analytical methods and must rely on expertise or personal judgment.  This 
“intuitive” approach to decision analysis, called recognition-primed decision (RPD), 
concluded that it is more important for a DM to understand the current condition and 
make a situational assessment, rather than develop and analyze all of the possible 
alternatives.  Korte (2003) argues that expertise is not enough.  A DM must be given 
tools and guidelines to make decisions that minimize the consequences.  The risk should 
be analyzed prior to a poor decision (Korte, 2003).  This risk analysis for this study is 
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being performed before the actual occurrence of an emergency.  This is similar to the 
concepts proposed by Korte (2003).  Once an emergency has occurred it is too late to 
make manpower decisions.  
Influence Diagrams 
 An influence diagram is a simplified, graphical model of a decision problem.  One 
advantage is the influence diagram “is intuitive enough to communicate with the decision 
makers and experts and, at the same time, precise enough for normative analysis” 
(Shachter, 1986).  Diehl and Haimes (2004) stated “The versatility of an influence 
diagram helps to foster communication between the domain experts, decision makers, 
and decision analysts when solving complex decision problems.”  An influence diagram 
consists of nodes and arcs.  The nodes represent uncertainties, decisions and 
consequences.  The arcs represent either dependence or sequential order (Shachter, 1986; 
Shachter, 1988).   
Samples of a single objective decision tree can be found in Shachter (1986) and 
Shachter (1988) and Lui et al. (2004).  A sample of a multi-objective tree is found in 
Diehl and Haimes (2004).  Influence diagrams can be used analyze and to calculate the 
expected outcome of a problem (Diehl and Haimes, 2004; Shachter, 1986; Shachter, 
1988).  However, influence diagrams are simplified representations of a problem or 
decision and the math may not be as straightforward as in a decision tree.  Therefore, all 
analysis was done using a decision tree.  An influence diagram was an effective starting 
point for the creation of a decision tree. 
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Decision Tree 
 Raiffa (1968) described a decision tree is a “road map” of a decision.  Decision 
trees are used to aggregate decision alternative scores as a function of uncertain events 
and event outcomes (Raiffa, 1968).  An uncertain event is the likelihood of a risk 
scenario and the uncertain outcomes are the likelihood of a consequence, making a 
decision a logical choice for aggregation of risk.  In order to properly model a decision in 
a decision tree, the uncertain events must follow two rules.  The uncertain event must be 
collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive meaning the uncertain event must have 
exactly one possible outcome (Clemen and Reilly, 2001). 
 Decision trees follow a sequential order, so the placement of decision and chance 
nodes may be important.  Decision nodes should be placed before the chance events that 
will still be uncertain at the time that decision will be made.  Chance events that are 
conditionally dependent should be placed in the proper chronological order.  If chance 
nodes are independent, the order in which the events are modeled, as long as it is after the 
appropriate decision node, is arbitrary (Diehl and Haimes, 2004). 
 There are two basic types of decision trees.  The type chosen depends on the goal.  
The first type is a decision tree designed to provide insight about a decision.  This 
decision-based decision tree is designed to model all of the pertinent information around 
a decision or series of decisions.  The ultimate goal of decision-based decision trees is to 
consistently make good decisions (Kirkwood, 1997).  The second type of decision tree is 
based on inductive reasoning.  An inductive decision tree is focused on classification.  
Inductive decision trees attempt to classify an unknown object by matching the unknown 
object’s patterns to the patterns of a known class of objects (Quinlan, 1990).  Two 
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examples of the application of inductive decision trees are diagnoses of hypothyroid 
conditions (Quinlan, 1999) and evaluation of the credit-risk of an applicant (Mues et al., 
2004).  For the purposes of this research, decision-based decision trees are referred to as 
decision trees.  Inductive decision trees were not used for this research. 
 One of the difficulties with decision trees is that they can easily become too large 
for a DM to comprehend.  The number of nodes and the continuous variables can make 
the decision tree hard to manage and understand (McCreary, 1973).  Decision trees must 
be accurate enough to be useful, but a decision tree must be simple enough to understand 
(Quinlan, 1999).  There are various ways to simplify a model.  McCreary (1973) briefly 
covered two general approaches.  This first, the common sense approach, is accomplished 
by eliminating branches that are not feasible or eliminating chance nodes that are 
determined not to be a part of the decision process or provide no added value.  The 
second approach is an analytical process.  The analytical process trims a tree by 
simplifying forks in the tree, which can result in an exponentially smaller tree.  An 
example of trimming the forks would be to truncate an uncertain event while maintaining 
an adequate level of accuracy. 
Sensitivity analysis can aid in trimming unnecessary branches.  Sensitivity 
analysis will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.  Techniques used to filter and 
rank risk scenarios discussed earlier (Haimes, 2004; Haimes et al., 2002) can be used to 
simplify decisions.  For problems in which a decision tree cannot be simplified to an 
understandable or functional level, a graphical decision tree can be eliminated.  A 
decision tree can be represented as a series of mathematical formulas and the data can be 
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organized in a table (Berger and Zeng, 2006).  Once the tree has been formed there are 
various methods for analyzing the tree. 
Decision Tree Analysis 
 Expected value (EV) is a common methodology for analyzing decision trees 
(Frohwein et al., 1999).  Analysis of a decision tree by means of EV is called “folding 
back” or “rolling back” the tree.  A decision tree’s EV is calculated by starting at the 
termination node and continuing to “roll the tree back” until the first level decision is 
reached.  When a chance node is encountered, the probability and consequence for each 
individual branch is multiplied.  Each individual branch on a chance node is then added 
together.  When a decision node is encountered, the consequence on each individual 
branch is analyzed and the appropriate branch is chosen (Clemen and Reilly, 2001).   
EV may be effective for many decision trees, but there are cases where EV fails to 
be a valid representation of the goal.  In problems where EV is not a good solution or 
probabilities are not available, there are a number of established rules for decision tree 
analysis.  Some examples of other techniques used to solve decision trees are the 
maximax rule, the maximin rule, the equal likelihood rule, and the minimax regret rule.  
For more detailed information on these rules see Trueman (1974).  An additional 
technique is the Hurwicz rule.  For more information about the Hurwicz rule see Haimes 
(2004) and Frohwein et al. (1999).  However, expected value (EV) was determined to be 
the most representative technique for this research and therefore was used to solve the 
decision tree. 
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 Single Dimension Value Function (SDVF) 
A single dimension value function (SDVF) is used in multi-objective decision 
analysis to convert the consequence values into a common unit.  Many of the 
consequence relationships (SDVF for this study) in the literature are linear.  Korte (2003) 
uses a linear relationship for loss of life.  Keeny and Winterfeldt (1994), Cox et al. 
(2005), and Winterfeldt and O’Sullivan (2006) used linear relationships for cost and loss 
of life consequences.  Converting the consequences into common units allows trade-offs 
between the consequences to be established (Kirkwood, 1997).   
  Additive Value or Trade-off Function 
 Kirkwood stated trade-offs between the consequences can be used to combine the 
consequences into a single consequence.  The method used in this research to create a 
single consequence is the additive value function.  The trade-off values are the relative 
importance of the consequences in terms of making the decision, and they are used to 
calculate the weights of the additive value function.  One of the assumptions with the 
additive value function is mutual preferential independence.  Mutual preferential 
independence means there is no preferential dependence between any of the variables 
used in the function.  Variable X is preferentially independent of variable Y, if changes in 
Y do not change the value of X (Kirkwood, 1997).  Once the consequences have been 
combined into a common unit, the tree can be “rolled back” resulting in a list of values 
for each decision.  However, because there is often uncertainty involved in a decision 
tree, other methods have been developed to further analyze decision tree results. 
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Value of Information (VOI) 
 Value of information is “the benefit of collecting additional information to reduce 
or eliminate uncertainty in specific decision making context” (Yakota and Thompson, 
2004).  VOI analysis looks at the payoff of having better information compared to the 
cost of obtaining the information.  “By considering the expected value [of information] 
we can decide whether an expert is worth consulting, whether a test is worth performing, 
or which of several information sources would be the best to consult” (Clemen and 
Reilly, 2001).  Another aspect of VOI is sensitivity analysis.  If a variable of a decision 
does not impact that decision, then it would be a waste of time and resources to collect 
more information on that variable (Clemen and Reilly, 2001). 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 Eschenbach (1992) defined sensitivity analysis “as examining the impact of 
reasonable changes in base-case assumptions.”  Trueman (1974) stated sensitivity 
analysis is an “approach which allows us to explore the effect on the optimal decision(s) 
of possible changes in any of the problem variables.”  There are a number of reasons why 
sensitivity analysis is used.  Kirkwood (1997) explains sensitivity analysis is used “to 
determine the impact on the ranking of alternatives of changes in various model 
assumptions.”  In addition “sensitivity analysis may be used (1) to make better decisions, 
(2) to decide which data estimates should be refined before making a decision, or (3) to 
focus managerial attention of the most critical elements during implementation” 
(Eschenbach, 1992).   
There are multiple means of performing sensitivity analysis on a decision.  One-
way sensitivity analysis is used to determine the effect the range of a variable has on the 
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EV.  One-way analysis graphs an uncertain variable on the x-axis and plots it against the 
EV of the alternatives.  If alternative lines cross, the EV for the alternatives is equal at 
that point.  This signifies a change in the preferred decision (von Winterfeldt and 
O’Sullivan, 2006).  A tornado diagram stacks all of the variables, so their effect on the 
EV can be compared (Clemen and Reilly, 2001).  “A tornado diagram quickly highlights 
those variables to which the outcome is most sensitive” (Eschenbach, 1992).  A spider 
plot is a graph of the change in each variable against the expected value.  Because of the 
complexity of a spider plot, the number of variables that can be plotted together is 
limited; however, spider plots contain more information than other types of sensitivity 
analysis (Eschenbach, 1992).  Two-way sensitivity analysis provides insight into the 
interaction of two variables with EV.  Two-way analysis is a graph with one variable on 
the x-axis, one variable on the y-axis, and a curve to show where the preferred solution 
changes. 
Utility 
 Utility is a DM’s attitude toward risk.  Utility is captured by replacing EV with 
expected utility (EU) (Kirkwood, 1997).  When determining utility, consideration should 
be given to “the decision maker’s attitude in two aspects:  the attitude toward profit 
which associates with the payoff value and the attitude toward risk which associates with 
the risk or probability of the alternative” (Liu and Da, 2005).  There are three types of 
decision makers with regards to risk:  (a) risk averse, (b) risk neutral, and (c) risk seeking 
(Kirkwood, 1997).  There are multiple theories and methods to account for risk in a 
decision maker (Clemen and Reilly, 2001; Haimes, 2004; Kirkwood, 1997; Lui and Da, 
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2005).  This purpose of this study was to present the actual risk levels to the DM so a 
more informed decision can be made.  Therefore, utility was not used in this research. 
Decision Tree Models in Literature 
 Diehl and Haimes (2004) stated that decision trees have become “perhaps the 
most well known representation of decision problems.”  Because a decision tree analyzes 
a decision as a function of the chance of an uncertain event and the resulting 
consequences, it can almost always be seen as form of risk analysis.  Often times, 
decision trees analyze the effect of different mitigation techniques on the risk level.  In 
addition, decision trees are not specific to a certain field.  A review of the literature that 
discusses decision trees show they have been used widely and in many diverse fields. 
Decision trees have been used in project management.  Gustafsson and Salo 
(2005) created and designed a decision tree to provide the DM with insight into which 
risky projects to start and/or continue.  The tree has multiple decision points along the 
way which allow for cost benefit analysis throughout the length of a project.  This allows 
the DM opportunities to decide whether to start a new project, continue an existing 
project, or cancel existing projects to maximize expected monetary value (EMV).  
Gustafsson and Salo included uncertainty about money available and decisions were 
based on the payback for resource allocation (Gustafsson and Salo, 2005) 
As discussed earlier, Cox et al. addressed the problem of tracking imported 
Canadian cattle in the United States (U.S.).  The “tracking” or “not tracking” of cattle is 
the decision and is also a risk mitigation technique.  The decision tree is modeled based 
on the risk of disease from imported Canadian cattle.  The consequences were cost of 
tracking and testing and lost revenue due to adverse market reaction.  Cox et al., used a 
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trade-off function to combine the consequences.  For tracking and testing cost, historical 
data and logical reasoning were used to determine the probabilities.  For infection rate, 
historical data was used in combination with the binomial distribution.  Cox et al. based 
the decision on EMV (Cox et al., 2005). 
 Decision trees can be used for situations that involve politics or emotion and 
analyze them strictly as analytical problems.  For example, Keeny and von Winterfeldt 
(1993) used decision trees to analyze the optimal management of spent nuclear waste.  
Two trees were developed in this model.  The first tree examined the present decision and 
the second tree looked at the decision to be made in 100 years (the proposed time the 
repository will accept waste).  The alternatives for the present and future trees were 
storage location.  The uncertainty in the “present” tree was the possible licensing issues 
and were primarily technology based uncertainties dealing with advances in the handling 
of nuclear waste, constructing repositories, and medical treatments for cancer for the 
“future” tree (Keeny and von Winterfeldt, 1993).   
Keeny and von Winterfeldt (1993) examined nine consequences, based on the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act, in the study.  The consequences included loss of life, social 
impact, direct costs, indirect costs, and environmental issues.  Cancer cases and loss of 
life were determined by previous studies (DOE, EPA, etc.) and logical judgments and 
consider all areas including construction, transportation, radiation, etc.  A linear value 
tradeoff was determined to aggregate consequences into a common unit.  Loss of life 
“pre-closure” and “post-closure” was estimated to have a $4 million to 1 and $1 to 1 
million value tradeoff, respectfully.  Likelihood was almost all subjective, although some 
historical data was used.  Both value tradeoffs and “arbitrary” likelihood determinations 
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were addressed in the sensitivity analysis.  Keeny and von Winterfeldt based the decision 
on EMV and the resulting sensitivity analysis (Keeny and von Winterfeldt, 1993). 
 As discussed earlier, Berger and Zeng (2006) used decision tree analysis without 
actually creating the graphical tree.  The decision was the optimal number of sources to 
use as suppliers.  Using the mathematical representation also helped with sensitivity 
analysis because changes to the approximations of the uncertainties could easily be made.  
The large amount of uncertainty made this problem too complicated to represent on a 
decision tree.  However, the decision only has one chance node, one probability, and one 
consequence.   The lack of diversity in the tree brings accuracy into question. 
 Korte (2003) used risk analysis and decision trees to determine the preferred 
solution for an emergency situation in an offshore helicopter.  Nine rules of “contingent 
risk and decision analysis” are described.  A graphical representation of Korte’s (2003) 
rules can be seen on Figure 2.2.   
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Figure 2.2:  Nine Rules of Contingent Risk and Decision Analysis (Korte, 2003) 
 
 
The decision was whether to attempt to fly the helicopter back to a landing site or attempt 
an emergency landing, and the consequence was loss of life.  Loss of life and 
probabilities were determined by three factors.  The first is the weather, defined as calm, 
moderate, severe, or extreme.  The second is the condition of the sea, defined as the 
temperature of the sea, determined by the season (winter, intermediate seasons, and 
summer).  The final factor was the time it takes rescue crews to respond.  The factors 
were known at the time of emergency.  Loss of life and likelihood were determined 
conditionally to the three factors.  Korte (2003) recognize other consequences like 
material loss, but these consequences were not included because the only time material 
loss would be considered is when there was not a clear decision based on fatality risk 
(Korte, 2003).   
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 Another example of using decision trees to analyze risk mitigation techniques is 
from vonWinterfeldt and O’Sullivan (2006).  A decision tree was used to determine if 
equipping commercial airplanes with missile countermeasures would be cost effective.  
There was a large amount of uncertainty in both the likelihood and consequence of the 
decision.  There were multiple reasons for the uncertainty, i.e. the diversity of the airline 
industry, unpredictability of terrorist strikes, different types of missiles, and classified 
information.  Instead of determining the actual likelihood and consequences, von 
Winterfeldt and O’Sullivan (2006) used ranges for these values.  A base case was chosen, 
the tree was “rolled back,” and sensitivity analysis was preformed (von Winterfeldt and 
O’Sullivan, 2006) 
According to von Winterfeldt and O’Sullivan (2006) the preferred decision was 
determined by analyzing five consequences.  The consequences were: (a) loss of life 
(LL), (b) cost of plane (CP), (c) economic loss (EL), (d) number of false alarms (FA), and 
(e) cost of countermeasures (CC).  With the exception of LL and FA, all other figures 
were in dollars.  In order to create a common unit, the monetary value of a life (VOL) 
was estimated to be a range from $0 to $10 million per life with a base case of $5 million 
and the monetary value of a false alarm (VOF) was estimated to be a range from $0 to 
$100 million per incident, with a base case of $10 million.  Both of these trade-off 
functions were linear relationships.  Multiple methods of sensitivity analysis were 
performed in von Winterfeldt and O’Sullivan (2006).  The first analysis was the manual 
manipulation of the likelihood and consequences values.  This was accomplished by 
using a program that used “sliders” to adjust the values and produced real-time graphical 
results.  Tornado analysis was then performed and allowed for visual representation of 
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the effect of each variable on the decision. One-way sensitivity and two-way sensitivity 
analysis were also performed (von Winterfeldt and O’Sullivan, 2006). 
Manpower in Literature 
 Many different types of manpower problems and decisions have been addressed 
in the literature.  Various scheduling issues have been solved.  Legato and Monaco 
(2004) used a linear program (LP) to solve a scheduling issue of varying manpower in a 
marine container terminal.  A long-term schedule, which was fixed, and a short-term 
schedule, which could vary, were created to optimize costs and provide adequate 
manpower to cover fluctuations in demand.  A similar scheduling problem was addressed 
by Wild and Schneeweiß (1993).  Wild and Schneeweiß (1993) used a hierarchical 
approach to decompose and solve the scheduling problem.  Additionally, computer 
technology has aided manpower scheduling.  Verbeek (1991) created software to simplify 
and aid in the scheduling of airline pilots.  Elhakeem and Hegazy (2005) used graphs to 
simplify scheduling options for the DM.  Computer models have allowed for much of the 
complex math to be hidden from the DMs, for rapid recalculation to adjust for unforeseen 
problems, and for simulations to be run prior to actual scheduling.  Firefighter 
scheduling, to provide at least minimum manpower coverage, was addressed with linear 
programming by Fry et al. (2006).  However, Fry et al (2006) did not attempt to 
determine the minimum manpower level, it was already determined prior to the research.  
Scheduling research attempts to determine the personnel that are needed to handle a load.  
However, some manpower research has focused on the proper location and relocation of 
manpower to mitigate risk.   
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 Mathematical programming has been used to determine the proper deployment 
and relocation of emergency services.  Sathe and Miller-Hooks (2005) used mathematical 
programming to optimize the location and relocation of military security forces.  The 
goals were to minimize costs and appropriately guard all critical facilities.  Kolesar and 
Walker (1973) developed a model for the location of fire houses and relocation of fire 
companies to provide at least minimum coverage in all areas.  Kolesar and Walker (1973) 
defined minimum coverage as “at least one of the closest three engines and at least one of 
the closest two ladders must be available for every alarm box in the city.”  Church et al. 
(2001) discussed the role of computer aided dispatch (CAD) programs and other 
technologies in improving upon mathematical modeling for location and relocation of 
emergency services. 
 Firefighter manpower has also been examined as a function of risk.  Halpern et al. 
(1982) used risk as a function of time to complete an emergency activity and network 
analysis to determine manpower.  Networks of events to complete various scenarios were 
mapped, and then the time to complete each network was developed.  Halpern et al 
(1982) suggested that the time-based networks can be used to determine proper 
manpower levels.  In addition to Halpern et al. (1982), Lawrence (2001) also evaluated 
manpower by quantifying risk as a function of time.  Four experiments were conducted 
with different size fire crews and the time to complete each scenario was recorded.  Fire 
department manpower recommendations were made based on the size of fire crew and 
time relationship.  
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Summary 
 The literature review provided the background on risk, methods to quantify risk, 
and decision analysis.  It also provided examples of risk, manpower, influence diagrams, 
and decision trees that were used as the basis for this research.  The research showed 
there is a lack of literature that attempts to quantify risk and determine manpower based 
on this quantification.  In most cases the manpower levels are determined or subjectively 
assumed prior to analysis.  This study quantified the risk for an FES flight and analyzes 
the effect different manpower levels have on that risk.  The remaining chapters provide 
the methodology (Chapter 3), the data collection and results (Chapter 4), and the 
conclusion (Chapter 5), for this research. 
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III.  Methodology 
 
Introduction 
This chapter defines the methodology used to determine and aggregate risk for 
associated manpower levels (ML) within the United States Air Force (USAF) Fire and 
Emergency Services (FES) flights.  The goal of the research is to create a decision tool 
that will provide insight to the risk FES flights’ decision makers (DM) assume when 
determining manpower levels.  Risk is classically quantified by identifying the risk 
scenarios and the associated likelihood and consequences of each scenario.  Therefore, in 
this research, the aggregate risk is a function of the risk scenarios an FES flight may 
encounter, each scenario’s likelihood, and the associated consequence.  A risk scenario is 
a combination of a potential need for an FES response and the manpower available to 
respond.  The formula consists of the following three components (Haimes, 2004; Kaplan 
and Garrick, 1981): 
• Si represents risk scenario i (combination of FES alarms and manpower level) 
• Li represents the likelihood of ith scenario (the likelihood of each scenario) 
• Xi represents the consequence of the ith scenario (the average cost in dollars 
and loss of lives) 
 
Kaplan and Garrick (1981) combined the variables to form the following classic risk 
equation, Equation (3.1).  The c, added later (Haimes, 2004), symbolizes that the list 
should be a complete list of scenarios. 
 
ciii XLSR },,{ ><=     (3.1) 
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General Approach 
The general approach of this research is a slight variation of the methodology 
proposed by Clemen and Reilly (2001) and Korte (2003) and is shown in Figure 2.1 and 
Figure 2.2, respectively.  A combination of the two methods was used to apply Clemen 
and Reilly (2001) decision analysis (DA) techniques to a risk analysis methodology 
similar to the one shown in Korte (2003).  The steps are shown on Figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1:  Model of the Approach Methodology 
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 Figure 3.1 shows the individual steps of the methodology used in this study.  
Chapter three details the methodology of steps1 through 11.  Chapter 4 addresses the 
actual analysis and presents the findings. 
Problem 
The problem is to determine the risk associated with an FES flight’s manpower level 
and then to determine cost/benefit relationship.  The mitigation technique utilized is 
varying levels of manpower.  The USAF is a large and diverse organization and FES 
flights may differ from one other.  Because of the possible differences in risk and 
manpower decisions, a single installation with its associated DM is used to validate this 
approach to risk quantification.  Dyess Air Force Base (AFB) was chosen as a 
representative installation to show the applicability of the methodology and the model.  
The DM for the analysis is the Deputy Fire Chief at Dyess AFB, who, due to temporary 
duty of the Fire Chief, was acting Fire Chief at the time of data collection.  The DM has 
more than 25 years of USAF firefighting experience at Dyess AFB and more than 27 
total years of firefighting experience.  This research is studying manpower shortages due 
to a standard 134-day deployment.  However, the risk analysis was run over the time 
frame of one 24-hour shift or one day.  A one-day time frame was chosen because it is 
assumed that manpower scheduling can be done on a shift-by-shift basis. 
Model Technique 
A decision tree was chosen as the analytical tool used to quantify Dyess AFB FES 
manpower risk for a deployment.  A decision tree quantifies a decision as a function of 
scenarios, scenario probabilities, and outcomes and therefore, provides an excellent 
structure to calculate Equation (3.1).  A primary benefit of decision trees is the ability to 
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analyze the possible outcomes of a chance event and the impact of that chance event’s 
consequence.  A decision tree also allows the decision maker to see the data across all of 
the alternatives in order to help determine the preferred decision (Clemen and Reilly, 
2001).  In a decision tree, the likelihood (Li) correlates directly to the probability assigned 
to a chance node, the risk scenarios (Si) are the events for a chance node, and the risk 
scenario consequences (Xi) correlate with the consequences or outcomes on the decision 
tree.  Precision Tree (2004) software is used to create and analyze the decision tree.  In 
this software a decision is represented by a square node, likelihood by a circle node, and 
consequence by a triangle node.  A consequence can be entered at any one of the nodes, 
but for the purposes of this research, consequences were only entered at the consequence 
nodes.  An example of a decision tree is shown in Figure 3.2.   
 
 
Figure 3.2:  Decision Tree Example 
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The decision tree will be “rolled back” to calculate the expected risk value for each 
decision.  Once the model is populated, the next step is to calculate the chance nodes, 
starting on the right of the decision tree.  The formula for the calculation of a chance node 
is shown in Equation (3.2).   
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where: 
n represents an integer 1, 2, 3, …, total number of chance nodes 
CNn represents chance node n 
Sn,i represents and scenario i of node n 
XSn,i represents the consequence for scenario i of node n 
LSn,i represents the consequence for scenario i of node n 
Once a chance node is calculated, the node can be removed, resulting in another set of 
consequence nodes.  The values of the new consequence nodes are equal to the value of 
the removed chance nodes.  This process is repeated until only a single decision node 
remains.   
Alternatives 
The alternatives are levels of manpower as a percentage of assigned manpower 
assigned to Dyess AFB.  Manpower levels are a discrete variable, but have a large 
number of possibilities.  In order to create an operable tool, manpower levels were 
truncated.  A 100 % manpower level is defined as no firefighters deployed.  The 
minimum manpower level is defined as 10% because at the 10% manpower level, there is 
no benefit gained by even having an FES flight at Dyess AFB.  A standard work cycle for 
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a firefighter is six 24-hour shifts with at least one day off in between workdays.  After the 
sixth 24-hour shift, the firefighter receives a day off, called a Kelly day.  Due to training, 
permanent change of station (PCS), temporary duty (TDY), administrative duties, 
manpower slots not filled, injury, Kelly days, etc., it is estimated that between 10% and 
20% of firefighters not deployed will not be available for their standard shift (Jones, 
2007).  The 10% to 20% reduction in manpower available is referred to as normal 
absences.  In addition to the normal absences, an additional five firefighters are not 
available for alarm response.  These five positions are the shift chief and two emergency 
dispatchers per shift.  These personnel were assumed to always be unavailable and were 
therefore, not considered in this analysis.  Dyess AFB FES flight is divided into two 
shifts.  A maximum 100 % manpower level is determined to be the maximum and a 10% 
manpower level is the minimum.  The remaining alternatives were divided into 10% 
increments.  Tables 3.1 and Table 3.2 show the manpower level breakdown for both 10% 
and 20% normal absences, respectively.  Additionally, a decision tree with the manpower 
levels is presented on Figure 3.3. 
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Table 3.1:  Manpower Distribution Chart 10% Normal Absences 
 
 
Table 3.2:  Manpower Distribution Chart 20% Normal Absences 
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Figure 3.3:  Decision Tree for Manpower Level 
Risk Scenarios 
An exhaustive list of risk scenarios must be developed to provide a complete risk 
analysis.  Additionally, a requirement for using a decision tree is that each risk scenario 
must be mutually exclusive, meaning there is only one possible combination of outcomes.  
FES flights are very dynamic and cover a wide range of responsibilities.  The list of 
possible risk scenarios is large and virtually impossible to develop.  Therefore, the 
scenarios were categorized similarly to Kaplan and Garrick (1981).   In order to 
categorize the risk scenarios for an FES flight, a complete list of FES responsibilities was 
created first.  Each of these responsibilities is a category that represents multiple risk 
scenarios.  Table 3.3 shows the list of Fire Protection Flight responsibilities created at the 
Fire Reshaping Conference (2006).  
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Table 3.3:  FES Responsibility List (Fire Reshaping Conference, 2006) 
Core Missions Non-Core Mission 
Firefighting Firefighting 
Aircraft Wildland 
Structural Mutual Aid 
Vehicle Weapons Storage Area 
Equipment High-rise Building 
Brush/Grass Transient Aircraft 
HAZMAT HAZMAT 
Offensive Biological/Chemical/WMD 
Defensive Railway 
 Public Highway 
Rescue Rescue 
Fire Water 
Vehicle/Equipment High Angle 
HAZMAT Fuel Cell/Tank 
Confined Space Trench 
EMS Support EMS Support 
Sudden Illness Basic Life Support 
Injury Advanced Life Support 
 Transport 
 
 
 
In order to reduce the combinatorial aspects of the tool, the DM wase asked to 
rank the responsibilities.  An additional category “Other” is also created that includes all 
other risk scenarios.  The DM was asked to determine and rank the three most important 
FES responsibilities in reference to manpower decisions at Dyess AFB.  Consequently, 
all responsibilities not specifically modeled were considered part of the “Other” category.  
Table 3.4 shows this ranking. 
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Table 3.4:  Top Three FES Responsibilities with Regards to Manpower (Jones, 2007) 
Rank FES Responsibility 
1 Aircraft Response (Aircraft) 
2 Structural Response (Structural) 
3 Hazardous Material Response (HAZMAT) 
 
 
 
The ranking resulted in four categories to be modeled: Aircraft Response, 
Structural Response, Hazardous Materials Response, and “Other” Response.  The four 
categories are defined in Table 3.5. 
 
 
Table 3.5:  Risk Category Definitions 
Risk Category Definition 
Aircraft Any FES response, thought to be an emergency or potential 
emergency response, in which FES manpower is deployed in a 
manner consistent with Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF). 
Structural Any FES response, thought to be an emergency or potential 
emergency response, in which FES manpower is deployed in a 
manner consistent with Structural Rescue and Response. 
HAZMAT Any FES response, thought to be an emergency or potential 
emergency response, in which FES manpower is deployed in a 
manner consistent with Hazardous Materials Rescue and Fire 
Fighting. 
Other An FES response, thought to be an emergency or potential 
emergency, for any reason outside of the reasons listed above. 
 
 
 
It was assumed the categories were independent; meaning the likelihood of an 
occurrence in one category does not change the likelihood of an occurrence in another 
category.  In order to insure the categories were independent, any alarm or response that 
is part of two categories was considered as a part of the initiating category.  For example, 
if an aircraft fire starts a building on fire, the structural emergency was considered part of 
the aircraft emergency and therefore be counted under the Aircraft category.  All 
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responsibilities that require FES manpower, but were not considered emergencies or 
potential emergencies, were assumed to be included in the normal absences.  The risk 
categories were dissected further into two secondary risk categories.  The secondary risk 
categories are listed and defined in Table 3.6.   
 
 
Table 3.6 Secondary Category Definitions 
Secondary 
Category 
 
Definition 
Yes There is an alarm and it is an emergency or potential emergency in that risk 
category 
False There is an alarm, it is in that category, but there is no emergency or 
reasonable potential for an emergency for that alarm. 
 
 
 
The result of combining the risk categories and secondary risk categories was 
eight sub-categories.  These sub-categories are dichotomous, meaning they each have 
only two possible outcomes per risk scenario.  The two outcomes are “Occur,” which 
means there was an occurrence of an alarm in that sub-category and “No,” which means 
there was no occurrence of an alarm in that sub-category.  A risk scenario was defined as 
the combination of outcomes in the eight individual sub-categories.  For example one 
possible outcome is:  “Aircraft-Yes, Occurs” / “Aircraft-False, No” / “Structural-Yes, 
No” / “Structural-False, Occurs” / “HAZMAT-Yes, No” / HAZMAT-False, No” / 
“Other-Yes, Occurs” / “Other-False, Occurs.”  The possible risk scenarios will be 
discussed further in the modeling step of the methodology.  The eight dichotomous sub-
categories per risk scenario resulted in 256 potentially unique risk scenarios and 
consequences per manpower level.   
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Consequences 
Consequences were determined using the combination of historical data and the 
expert opinion of the DM.  Historical data was used to determine the consequences for 
the average manpower level.  It was assumed the historical consequence data represents 
the 100% manpower level alternative.  Although manpower has fallen below the 100% 
level during the data collection period, it was considered a conservative estimate.  From 
this data an expected cost per alarm in each sub-category was calculated.  The remaining 
consequence data were determined by soliciting the DM’s expert opinion.  The DM was 
asked to determine manpower risk factors for each manpower level.  A manpower risk 
factor is the factor that represents the increase in the consequences due to changes in the 
manpower level.  Consequences were measured in the following two areas: 
• Total Cost (TC) (Material Loss + Response Costs) 
• Loss of Life (LOL) 
Total cost (TC) is the sum of material loss and response costs.  Material loss is the 
FES reportable dollar loss associated with the cost to repair, replace, or otherwise rectify 
a loss as a result of damage caused by an incident.  Response costs are the costs of the 
response itself.  They were reported in the Automated Civil Engineer System – Fire 
Department (ACES-FD) and they are the cost of manpower to respond and vehicle “wear 
and tear,” based on the time of response (Jones, 2007).  Loss of life (LOL) is the total 
number of fatalities sustained by firefighters and non-firefighters as a result of an 
incident. 
In order to avoid unintentional weighting, the consequences were converted into 
the same units.   The unintentional weighting is a result of loss of life being a relatively 
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small number compared to total cost.  There was enough difference in the consequences 
that loss of life would have made a very minimal impact on the risk analysis if a common 
unit was not developed.  The intention of this research was to allow the DM to determine 
the relationship between the consequences; therefore, the consequences need to be in 
common units.  A linear single dimension value function (SDVF), Equation (3.3), was 
used to calculate a common unit for the consequences (Kirkwood, 1997).  The SDVF is 
assumed to be linear to simplify the model.  Justification for the assumption is provided 
in Chapter 2. 
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where: 
Xi,j represents the value of the consequence for Si and consequence j 
Greatest (Xi,j) represents the largest value for all Si and consequence j 
Smallest (Xi,j ) represents the smallest value for all Si and consequence j 
v(Xi,j) represents the value of consequence Xi,j in risk mitigation units 
 
Equation (3.3) linear normalizes the consequences, meaning they have a value 
between 0 and 1.  The equation converted the consequences from their original units, 
dollars and lives, to a constructed unit called risk mitigation.  Risk mitigation units are 
defined as units that represent an FES flight’s ability to mitigate the risk that falls within 
the list of the FES flight’s responsibilities.  In the case of the original units, dollars and 
lives, less is better; in the case of risk mitigation units, more is better.  Therefore, the tree 
now changes from a minimization problem to a maximization problem. 
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Once the consequences were converted to a single unit, the trade-off values for 
the consequences were determined for the consequences and they were combined using a 
linear additive value function similar to Kirkwood (1997).  One of the requirements of 
the additive value function is mutual preferential independence, meaning the value placed 
on a consequence does not depend on the value of the other consequence.  Loss of life 
and total cost are preferentially independent of each other, therefore, the additive value 
function was used.  The consequences were given weights and a single consequence was 
determined by using the additive value function seen in Equation (3.4) and Equation 
(3.5).   
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where: 
n represents the number of consequences 
v(XC,i) represents the combined single consequence value for Si 
w,j represents the weight of consequence j 
wTC represents the weight of the total cost consequence 
wLOL represents the weight of loss of life consequence 
v(XTC,i) represents the SDVF value of the total cost consequence for Si 
v(XLOL,i) represents the SDVF value of the total cost consequence for Si 
To weight the consequences the DM was asked to determine a relative importance 
of each consequence.  The weights were used in Equation (3.5) and a single consequence, 
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v(XC),was calculated for each risk scenario.  The single consequence was entered into the 
decision tree for analysis.  It was assumed the consequences from one event were not 
affected by the fact there was another event occurring.  In addition, mutual aid assistance 
from outside departments was not considered in this model.  However, incidents in which 
Dyess AFB provided mutual aid were modeled. 
Cost/Benefit Consequence 
An estimate was performed to calculate the cost of contractor labor.  This cost, called 
contractor cost (CC) was calculated using estimates from a cost analysis completed by 
Dyess AFB in 2002 in the document Temporary (Intermittent) Firefighter Plan (2002).  
Dyess AFB FES flight has 77 permanently assigned firefighters, including normal 
absences.  Therefore, a 10% difference in manpower was estimated at about 7.7 
firefighters.  The worst-case scenario was 59 shifts for a contract firefighter during a 
standard four-month deployment with 14 days of reconstitution time.  The cost 
breakdown per contracted employee per deployment can be seen in Table 3.7.   
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Table 3.7:  Cost Breakdown/Contracted Employee per Deployment (2002 dollars) 
 
 
 
 
The contractor cost (CC) to replace 10% of the FES manpower was therefore 
estimated to be $170,500.56 (2002 dollars).  In order to convert to 2007 dollars, an 
inflation index was used.  The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Cost and Economics 
(SAF/FMC) is required to publish USAF inflation indices annually.  SAF/FMC (2007) 
uses Equation (3.6) to calculate raw inflation rates.   
)1...(*)1(*)1(* 21 niii RateRateRateiII +++ +++=   (3.6) 
where: 
II represents the Inflation Index for the desired year 
i represents the base year as a 1.0 (2002) 
Ratei+1...Ratei+n represents the change in inflation rate between years 
n represents desired year of inflation index – base year (2007 – 2002) 
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The operations and maintenance, non-pay, non-POL raw inflation index was used 
for the conversion to 2007 dollars.  The inflation rate factor is 1.11917291394 
(SAF/FMC).  The 2007 contractor cost to replace 10% of the FES manpower is 
$170,500.56 * 1.11917291394 = $190,819.61.  This amount is the total for an entire 
deployment.  Because the time frame being analyzed was one 24-hour shift, it was 
divided by the number of 24-hour shifts during a deployment.  The estimation used was 
134 days; therefore, the contractor cost per 24-hour shift for a deployment is $190,819.61 
/ 134 = $1,424.03 
 The contractor cost is preferentially dependent on the expected risk mitigation 
value (ERM), meaning the value the DM places on money spent for contract firefighters 
changes for different ERM values.  The additive value function, Equation (3.4), requires 
mutual preferential independence; therefore, an additive value function was not used to 
combine contractor cost and ERM into the single consequence.  Instead, a series of pareto 
optimal graphs were created to represent the cost/benefit relationship. 
Likelihood 
Likelihood per 24-hour period was calculated using the Poisson distribution.  Poisson 
distributions are used to determine the likelihood of a given number of incidents over a 
time period.  The equation to calculate Poisson likelihood is shown in Equation (3.7) and 
the equation used to determine λi is shown in Equation (3.8).   
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where: 
Ai represents the number of alarms in sub-category i 
k represents an integer greater than or equal to zero 
P(Ai=k) represents the probability that Ai=k 
λi is the expected number of alarms in a sub-category i 
Ni is the number of responses in a sub-category i 
Di is the total number of time periods in which the Ni data was collected 
The Ni values were determined using historical data and Di was the number of 
days over which the Ni data was collected.  After Ni and Di were determined, λi was 
calculated for each sub-category.  The Poisson likelihood was determined for P(Ai=0) 
representing no alarms in the 24-hour time period.  Each chance event of a decision tree 
must be mutually exclusive; meaning the sum of all the probabilities must equal one.  
Therefore, 1 - P(Ai=0) was used as the likelihood of the occurrence of at least one alarm 
in the 24-hour time period.  However, it is assumed that all P(Ai>0) have the same 
consequence regardless of the value of Ai.  Once the risk categories and the modeling 
technique were identified, the decision was be modeled.  The first part of modeling the 
decision is developing an influence diagram.   
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Decision Models 
Influence Diagram 
An influence diagram was used to provide a simple, visual representation of the 
model.  Precision Tree (2004) software was used to create the influence diagram.  In this 
software, a rectangle represents a decision or an alternative, a circle represents a chance 
node or a category and the associated likelihood and consequences, a rectangle with 
rounded corners represents a calculation, and a diamond represents the desired outcome.  
The influence diagram can be seen in Figure 3.4.  For the purposes of this research, the 
influence diagram is a reference only and will not be used for calculation. 
 
 
Figure 3.4:  Influence Diagram 
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Decision Tree Models 
 The second part of the modeling process was creating the decision tree.  A 
decision tree was created from the influence diagram.  The resulting decision tree was too 
large and therefore, it was divided into sections.  The two sections are the Aircraft and 
Structural risk sub-category tree and the HAZMAT and “Other” risk sub-category tree.  
Each termination node in the Aircraft and Structural risk sub-category tree is linked to a 
unique HAZMAT and “Other” risk sub-category tree.  In addition, each manpower level 
has potential for unique consequences.  There are ten manpower levels in each model for 
a total of 2,560 potentially unique single consequences, v(XC), per model.  The decision 
tree more clearly illustrates a risk scenario as being any combination of “Occur” or “No” 
over the eight sub-categories.  The likelihood of a risk scenario is the product of the 
outcome’s likelihood and the consequence is a summation of the v(XC) for each of the 
sub-categories.  A sample of the Aircraft and Structural risk sub-category tree and the 
HAZMAT and “Other” risk sub-category tree can be seen in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6, 
respectively.   
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Figure 3.5:  Aircraft and Structural Risk Sub-Category Tree 
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Figure 3.6:  HAZMAT and Other Risk Sub-Category Tree 
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Decision Rules 
The information was presented to the decision maker in two ways.  The first way was 
the expected risk mitigation values (ERM).  ERM is calculated by “rolling back” the tree 
and determining the expected value of risk mitigation.  The second way was the results of 
a cost/benefit analysis.  A cost/benefit was calculated by using the cost to raise the 
manpower available level through the use of contract firefighters, to the manpower level.  
It assumed a one to one exchange between deployed FES manpower and contracted 
manpower.  Both ERM and cost/benefit are presented in tabular form and via pareto 
optimal graphs.   
Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis was used to check the decision tree’s sensitivity to variation in 
the likelihood, consequence, or weighting data.  The goal of sensitivity analysis is to 
determine what values could cause a change in the preferred solution.  However, in this 
research, the attempt was to provide insight to the DM to allow for a more informed 
decision.  Therefore, sensitivity analysis was used to determine what uncertainties the 
expected risk mitigation value was most sensitive too. 
Summary 
 The methodology and the model were completed.  The next step was to collect the 
data and population the model.  The model was then run and the results were analyzed.  
Chapter 4 is a discussion of data collection and the results.  Chapter 5 provides a 
discussion of the results. 
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IV.  Results and Analysis 
 
Introduction 
 There are three purposes for this chapter.  The first purpose, is to collect data from 
the test organization.  The test organization is the Fire and Emergency Services (FES) 
flight at Dyess Air Force Base (AFB).  The second purpose is to apply the methodology 
discussed in Chapter 3 to the test case.  The third purpose is to analyze the results and run 
sensitivity analysis. 
Data Collection 
Data was collected from a variety of sources.  Additionally, both objective and 
subjective data was used.  Subjective data was collected from the decision maker (DM), 
the Deputy Fire Chief for Dyess AFB’s FES flight.  He is a subject matter expert (SME) 
with 27 years firefighting experience, more importantly, has 25 years firefighting 
experience at Dyess AFB.  Historical data was collected from the National Fire Incident 
Reporting System (NFIRS), Automated Civil Engineer System-Fire Department (ACES-
FD), The Naval Safety Center, and internal data kept at Dyess AFB.  All USAF 
installations are required to input FES incident information into NFIRS as of 1 January 
2006.  The FES Reshaping Conference (2006) estimates NFIRS data and ACES-FD data 
to be 95% accurate over range in which data was collected. 
 Manpower Risk Factor 
 Manpower risk factors are subjective measures that measure the change in 
consequences due to the change in manpower.  Since the range of normal absences (NA) 
was estimated between 10% and 20%, manpower risk factors were collected at both the 
 60 
10% and 20% NA level.  The DM was asked to determine the change in risk as the 
manpower level (ML) level decreased.  The assumptions were normal working hours (no 
overtime), no mutual aid received and a time frame of one 24-hour shift during a 134-day 
deployment.   
 The DM stated that the risk would not increase until response capability fell 
below National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards.  The standards require an 
18-man crew response to an Aircraft emergency and a 12-man crew to both a Structural 
and HAZMAT emergency.  The response estimated for an “Other” emergency was a 4-
man crew.  A 4-man crew was chosen because most of the responses in the “Other” 
category require only a rescue truck and a fully manned rescue truck requires four 
firefighters.  In addition, the FES flight has “staff” positions or positions within the FES 
flight where personnel are assigned duties outside of normal firefighting shift work.  The 
DM determined that most “staff” positions could be placed into firefighting roles, for the 
length of a deployment, without increasing the risk.  However, five staff positions must 
always remain to perform the dispatch and command and control duties (Jones, 2007).  
The results of the correspondence can be seen on Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 for the 10% 
and 20% normal absence, respectively. 
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Table 4.1:  Manpower Risk Factor Data for 10% Normal Absences (Jones, 2007) 
 
 
Table 4.2:  Manpower Risk Factor Data for 20% Normal Absences (Jones, 2007) 
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A value of 1.0 as a manpower risk factor means there is no change in the 
consequence from the 100% manpower level and a value of 2.0 means there is a 100% 
increase from the 100% manpower level.  To determine the consequence for a sub-
category and a specific manpower level, the corresponding manpower risk factor is 
multiplied by the consequence for 100% manpower level.  For example, to determine the 
consequence for 20% normal absence, aircraft loss of life consequence, and 40% 
manpower available, the 100% consequence was multiplied by 1.60. 
 Likelihood Data 
 The likelihood data was calculated using the Poisson distribution and the Poisson 
likelihood equations shown in Equation (3.6) and Equation (3.7).  Historical data from 
the ACES-FD database was used to determine the number of responses (Ni).  The ACES-
FD data between 1 January 2004 and 25 January 2007 (1120 days) was compiled and the 
data was broken down by sub-category (Brown, 2007; Jones, 2007).  A summary of the 
number of responses (Ni) can be seen on Table 4.3.  A complete list of the ACES-FD data 
can be seen in Appendix A.   
 
 
Table 4.3:  Summary of ACES-FD Number of Responses Data 
 
 
 
 The 172 items that were omitted in Table 4.3 were training performed by the FES 
flight.  This training was deleted from the number of responses data because training was 
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already accounted for in the normal absence calculations.  Di was determined to be 1120 
for all sub-categories because that was the number of 24-hour shifts over which the Ni 
data was collected.  Once the Ni and the Di were determined, Equation (6) and Equation 
(7) were used to calculate λi, P(Ai=0), and 1 - P(Ai=0).  In decision trees the branches of 
a chance event must be mutually exclusive.  Calculating the likelihood using the method 
stated above maintains the mutual exclusivity, but it does combine the P(Ai ≥ 1) into the 
“Occur” branch for each sub-category.  Although there is a likelihood associated with 
more than one alarm in a sub-category, it was assumed the consequences were the same 
for all likelihood 1 - P(Ai=0).  Table 4.4 shows a summary of the likelihood data. 
 
 
Table 4.4:  Summary of the Poisson Distribution Likelihood Data 
 
 
 
 Total Cost (TC) Consequence Data 100% Manpower Level 
 Historical data was collected for the total cost (XTC) consequence.  It was 
assumed the historical XTC data was the data for the 100% manpower level.  All of the 
consequence data was a direct measure, with the exception of the proxy or indirect 
measure for the “HAZMAT-Yes, Occur” material cost consequence.  The historical data 
was averaged and assumed to be the consequence for the “Occur” outcome 100% 
manpower level sub-categories.  The average total cost for a sub-category was equal to 
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the response cost for the sub-category plus the material cost for the sub-category.  By 
definition the “No” outcome, for each sub-category, had no total cost consequence.  A 
summary of the XTC can be seen in Table 4.9. 
  Response Cost 
 Response costs are as reported in ACES-FD which calculates response costs 
monetarily as a function of manpower and “wear and tear” on the vehicle costs (Jones, 
2007).  The categorized ACES-FD data discussed earlier was used for the calculation of 
the response cost consequences and is summarized in Table 4.5.   
 
 
Table 4.5:  Summary of ACES-FD Response Cost Data 
 
 
 
A complete list of the ACES-FD data and breakdown can be seen in Appendix A.  
An average response cost per sub-category occurrence was calculated.  The average 
response cost per sub-category was calculated by dividing the total response cost (Table 
4.5) by the number of sub-category occurrences (Table 4.3).  A summary of the response 
cost data for 100% manpower level can be seen on Table 4.9. 
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  Material Cost 
 The material cost for the “Aircraft-Yes,” “Structural-Yes,” and “Other-Yes” 
alarm occurrences was calculated using a fire loss database maintained by Dyess AFB’s 
FES flight (Jones, 2007).  A query was performed over the time frame (1 January 2004 to 
24 January 2007).  The material cost for HAZMAT could not be measured in the same 
manner as the other material costs.  Dyess AFB’s FES flight is responsible for 
containment of HAZMAT emergencies.  Therefore, cost is not tracked by the FES flight.  
It was determined that a reasonable material cost for HAZMAT responses in terms of the 
FES flight’s responsibility was the total cost of clean-up supplies used (Jones, 2007).  
The cost data for clean-up supplies could only be tracked for one year.  The 2006 cost 
data for clean-up supplies was obtained from the contractor responsible for supplying 
Dyess AFB with the materials (Brigham, 2007).  By definition, there is no material loss 
for “False” alarms occurrence.  Table 4.6 summarizes the material cost results.   
 
 
Table 4.6:  Material Cost Summary 
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An average response cost for “Aircraft-Yes,” “Structural-Yes,” and “Other-Yes” 
alarm occurrences was calculated by dividing the total response cost (Table 4.6) by the 
number of sub-category occurrences (Table 4.3).  The ACES-FD database recorded 41 
HAZMAT “Yes” alarms in 2006.  Using 41 “Yes” occurrences and the total response 
cost in Table 4.6, an average material cost consequence for the “HAZMAT-YES” 
occurrence sub-category was calculated.  A complete breakdown of the 2006 ACES-FD 
HAZMAT data can be seen in Appendix B.  A summary of the response cost data for 
100% manpower level can be seen on Table 4.9. 
 Loss of Life (LOL) Consequence Data 100% Manpower Level 
 Fortunately, Dyess AFB has not lost a life reportable by the FES flight.  However, 
this does not mean the risk is not present.  The loss of life consequence (XLOL) data was 
collected from the Naval Safety Center.  The Naval Safety Center maintains all of the 
Department of Defense FES databases.  The USAF database maintained by the Naval 
Safety Center has data from 1984 to present.  From 1984 to 2003 the data is stored in a 
database called the Safety Information Management System (SIMS) and from 2002 to 
present; the data is stored in the NFIRS.  There is a one-year overlap because the 
database change was not instantaneous.  This may cause some overlap in data, but the 
overlap should be minimal (Lisa, 2007).  The database was queried from 1 January 1984 
to 13 February 2007.  Table 4.7 summarizes the results of the query.   
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Table 4.7:  Loss of Life Data from the Naval Safety Center (Lisa, 2007) 
 
 
 
By definition there are no loss of life consequences in the “False, Occurs” or any 
of the “No” sub-categories.  The NFIRS data showed that 94,267 or approximately 25% 
of the total incidents were “False” alarms.  The Other incident LOL data was collected by 
removing the 25% false alarms and the Aircraft, Structural, and HAZMAT incidents.  
Table 4.8 summarizes the loss of life consequences for all four categories.   
 
 
Table 4.8:  Loss of Life Data Calculating the “Other” Category (Lisa, 2007) 
 
 
 
The data in Table 4.8 was used to average the loss of life consequences by dividing the 
total loss of life per sub-category by the total number of incidents per sub-category.  
Table 4.9 summarizes the average loss of life consequence data as well as all of the 
average total cost data for 100% manpower level. 
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Table 4.9:  Consequence Data for 100% Manpower Level 
 
 
 
 Consequences for Remaining Manpower Levels 
 The consequences for the 100% manpower levels were assumed to be the 
historical data shown on Table 4.9.  The consequences for the remaining manpower 
levels are found by multiplying the manpower risk factors (Table 4.1 and Table 4.2) with 
the 100% manpower consequences for each sub-category.  A complete list of the 20% 
normal absence consequence data can be seen in Appendix C. 
 Using the Single Value Dimension Function (SDVF) 
When the loss of life and total cost consequences were analyzed separately the 
result was 256 risk scenarios for each of the ten manpower levels, for a total of 2,560 risk 
scenarios.  Because of the large number of consequences, from this point forward this 
study only analyzed the conservative estimate of 20% normal absence.  The methodology 
is the same regardless of the normal absence level.   
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In order to put  the loss of life and total cost consequences in the same terms, a 
linear single dimension value function (SDVF), as shown in Equation (3.3), was used to 
calculate XLOL and XTC.  The SDVF requires the calculation of the Greatest (Xi) and 
Smallest (Xi) variables for loss of life and total cost.  The Greatest (XLOL) was determined 
by finding the risk scenario, represented by the tree, with the greatest aggregated value 
for loss of life.  The Greatest (XTC) was determined in the same manner as Greatest 
(XLOL), but for the total cost consequence.  After running these scenarios it was 
determined the Greatest (Xi) for both loss of life and total cost occurred at the 10% 
manpower level when all eight alarms occurred (“Aircraft-Yes, Occurs” / “Aircraft-False, 
Occurs” / “Structural-Yes, Occurs” / “Structural-False, Occurs” / “HAZMAT-Yes, 
Occurs” / HAZMAT-False, Occurs” / “Other-Yes, Occurs” / “Other-False, Occurs.”).  
The Greatest (XLOL) was 0.00826 and the Greatest (XTC) was $26,118.56.  Therefore, the 
Greatest (XLOL) was estimated to be 0.009 and the Greatest (XTC) was estimated to be 
$27,000.00. 
The Smallest (Xi) was determined in the same manner as the Greatest (Xi) with the 
exception of determining the smallest value for loss of life and total cost.  The smallest 
value was a “No” outcome for all eight sub-categories.  This resulted in a Smallest (XTC) 
and a Smallest (XLOL) equal to zero.  Table 4.10 shows a portion of the results for v(XLOL) 
and v(XTC) at the 10% manpower level.   
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4.10:  Sample of Additive Value Function and SDVF for 10% ML and wTC=0.50 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen from the table, the problem now is a maximization problem with 
the constructed units of risk mitigation units.  In this table a value of “1” represents an 
“Occur” outcome in that sub-category and a value of “0” means there is “No” outcome in 
that sub-category.  The first four numbers represent the Aircraft and Structural sub-
categories and the last four represent the HAZMAT and “Other” sub-categories.  
Therefore, each of the 256 risk scenarios has a unique 8-digit identifier.  Manpower level 
and wTC to clearly identify which set of risk scenarios are being discussed.  
 Additive Value Function Weights 
 The next step was to calculate a single consequence for each risk scenario.  The 
first step was to determine the weights for the additive value function shown in Equation 
(3.4) and Equation (3.5).  An attempt was made to solicit these weights from the DM.  
However, the DM was unable to determine the weights.  In general, FES flights are 
concerned more with loss of life (XLOL) than with total cost (XTC), but that is not always 
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the case.  Dyess AFB FES flight’s primary responsibility is to the mission at Dyess AFB.  
This may create a situation where an incident with no potential for loss of life takes 
precedence over an incident where there is potential loss of life.  There may also be a 
situation with a small potential total cost takes precedent over a situation with a larger 
potential total cost.  Therefore, the weights can range from 0 to 1 for both wTC and wLOL.  
The analysis was run for five different values for wTC.  These values were wTC = 0, 0.25, 
0.50, 0.75, and 1.  Because the sum of the weights must be equal to one, wLOL = 1 - wTC.   
Determining a Single Consequence (XC) 
Once the consequences have been converted into risk mitigation units and the 
additive value function weights have been determined, a single consequence can now be 
determined using Equation (5) and Equation (6).  There are 2,560 risk scenarios if the 
consequences are analyzed separately.  Because there are five possible values being 
considered for wTC, once the consequences are combined using an additive value function 
the number of potentially unique consequences increases to 12,800.  Table 4.10 shows a 
sample of the v(Xc) values for the 10% manpower level and a wTC = 0.50.  A complete list 
of the 20% normal absence single consequences can be seen in Appendix D.   
Model 
The model can now be populated.  Figure 4.1 is the Aircraft and Structural sub-
category tree for 10% manpower level and a wTC = 0.5.  The consequence values in the 
Aircraft and Structural figure come from the combination with the HAZMAT and 
“Other” trees.  Figure 4.2 shows one of the HAZMAT and “Other” sub-category trees for 
the 10% manpower level and a wTC = 0.5.   
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Figure 4.1:  Aircraft and Structural Sub-Category Tree (10% ML and wTC=0.50) 
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Figure 4.2:  HAZMAT and “Other” Sub-Category Tree (10% ML and wTC=0.50) 
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The HAZMAT and “Other” sub-category trees’ (see Figure 4.2 for example) 
consequences are populated using the v(XC)’s calculated with the additive value function 
(see Table 4.10 for example).  Each HAZMAT and “Other” sub-category tree 
corresponds to a specific branch on the Aircraft and Structural sub-category tree.  Figure 
4.2 has a four digit binary identifier that designates a unique branch on the Aircraft and 
Structural sub-category tree.  This identifier corresponds to the first four digits in Table 
4.10 and means the same thing as the digits in that figure.  For example, the 1,1,1,1 
identifier in Figure 4.2 corresponds to the branch on the Aircraft and Structural sub-
category tree that has the outcome sequence “Aircraft-Yes, Occurs” / “Aircraft-False, 
Occurs” / “Structural-Yes, Occurs” /Structural-False, Occurs.”  The HAZMAT and 
“Other” sub-category trees are also potentially unique to manpower level and the value of 
wTC because both of the manpower level and wTC can affect the result of the additive 
value function.  A complete list of the consequence data can be seen in Appendix D. 
Results 
 The decision tree was “rolled back,” as described in Chapter 3, and the expected 
risk mitigation (ERM) per 24-hour shift was calculated.  The ERM’s for the different 
manpower levels and wTC’s are shown on Table 4.11. 
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Table 4.11:  ERM’s for Varying wTC Values 
 
 
If risk was the only concern, the manpower levels that give the maximum ERM 
are 60% and greater for wTC = 1 and 70% for all other values of wTC.  Figure 4.3 shows 
that, in general, as the manpower level increases the ERM will also increase.  However, 
there is a point where additional manpower level no longer increases the ERM.  Figure 
4.3 also appears to show that wTC = 1 gives the most conservative estimate for ERM and 
there is no increase for ERM above 60% manpower level.  However, the remaining 
manpower levels do show an increase in the ERM from 60% to 70% manpower level.  
This is due to the ability of Dyess FES flight to prevent loss of life, specifically in 
“Aircraft-Yes, Occurs” sub-category, which increases when the manpower level 
increases from 60% to 70%.  Therefore, if loss of life in “Aircraft-Yes” alarms is a major 
concern, wTC = 1 may not be the best way to determine manpower.  Understanding what 
causes of the differences in ERM can help the DM to determine the acceptable level of 
risk. 
 76 
0.600
0.625
0.650
0.675
0.700
0.725
0.750
0.775
0.800
0.825
0.850
0.875
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Manpower Level
ER
M
WTC = 0 WTC = 0.25 WTC = 0.50 WTC = 0.75 WTC = 1
 
Figure 4.3:  ERM’s for Varying wTC Values 
 
Table 4.12 shows the percent increase in ERM between each manpower level for 
varying levels of wTC.  The purpose of this table is to present the information to the DM 
in another way.  The tables answer the question, “How much does ERM increase or 
decrease for different scenarios?”  This type of data can be beneficial when discussing 
capability with other leadership who may not be familiar with the many of the activities 
an FES flight is involved in.   
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Table 4.12:  Increase in ERM Between ML for Varying wTC’s 
 
 
 It is important to remember the percentage increase in Table 4.12 is for a 24-hour 
period.  The table shows there is not a large increase in the step from the 60% to 70%.  
As the weight on total cost becomes more important, this gap decreases.  When loss of 
life is heavily weighted the increase from 60% to 70% is at its highest.  However, it is 
still only a slight difference.  In addition, when loss of life is weighted heavily, the gap 
between the 50% and 70% manpower level is small.  Analysis of Table 4.11, Table 4.12, 
and Figure 4.3 shows that maintaining manpower around 60% during a deployment will 
not cause a significant drop in ERM.  However, these figures are being analyzed without 
considering the contractor cost. 
Cost/Benefit Analysis 
 The analysis accomplished up to this point included total cost and loss of life, but 
excluded the cost for an FES flight to have the manpower available (MA).  The cost to 
have manpower available, or contractor cost, is determined as the cost to replace FES 
manpower with contractors.  In other words, during a deployment a fire chief may only 
have a limited number of firefighters available.  Contractor cost is the cost to increase the 
manpower available, using contract firefighters, to the desired manpower level.  The 
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contractor cost is determined by using a 2002 Dyess AFB cost estimate.  The 2002 
estimate was created to determine the cost of replacing Dyess AFB firefighters during a 
deployment.  The estimate was then converted into 2007 dollars.  The calculations can be 
seen in Chapter 3.  The contractor cost estimate for replacing 10% of the FES flight’s 
labor is $1,424.03.  The cost/benefit analysis was only performed for the 20% normal 
absence and the values of wTC were varied similarly to earlier analysis. 
Contractor cost cannot be combined with the other consequences because of 
preferential dependency problems.  This means the willingness to bring on contractor 
firefighters varies with different levels of ERM.  The DM is probably more willing to 
spend money to raise a low and dangerous ERM than he is to raise the ERM from 60% to 
70%.  Additive value functions cannot be used when there is no preferential dependence.  
Therefore, contractor cost was pareto optimally graphed versus ERM.  Figures 4.4 
through Figure 4.9 show the pareto optimal graphs for varying manpower available, the 
respective ERM’s, contractor cost, and varying values of wTC.  The graphs are intended to 
visually present the DM with the available options and to provide him with more detailed 
information to make manpower decisions.  An example would be a situation where the 
DM is short manned and encounters a shift with a large potential for loss of life.  The DM 
can get the information from the graph with the representative WLOL.  The data for these 
graphs can be seen in Appendix E. 
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Figure 4.4:  Pareto Optimal Graph for 10% Manpower Available 
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Figure 4.5:  Pareto Optimal Graph for 20% Manpower Available 
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Figure 4.6:  Pareto Optimal Graph for 30% Manpower Available 
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Figure 4.7:  Pareto Optimal Graph for 40% Manpower Available 
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Figure 4.8:  Pareto Optimal Graph for 50% Manpower Available 
 
0.600
0.625
0.650
0.675
0.700
0.725
0.750
0.775
0.800
0.825
0.850
0.875
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000
Contractor Cost ($)
ER
M
WTC = 0 WTC = 0.25 WTC = 0.50 WTC = 0.75 WTC = 1
60% MU
70% MU 80% MU 90% MU 100% MU
 
Figure 4.9:  Pareto Optimal Graph for 60% Manpower Available 
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The graphs are similar to the ERM results.  In general, as cost increases, the ERM 
also increases.  However, after 70% manpower level, there is no added ERM benefit to 
spend more money on contractor labor.  The cost/benefit graphs suggest the same 
solutions as the ERM.  There is little ERM gain between the 60% and 70% manpower 
level, and a greater than $1,400 increase in contractor cost.  In addition, the graph begins 
to level off around the 55% manpower level.  The most benefit occurs between 55% and 
65% using the results of the pareto optimal graphs. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 There was a great deal of uncertainty associated with the model.  Normally, 
sensitivity analysis is performed to determine how changes to uncertainty in the model 
may affect the preferred solution.  However, this model was not intended to suggest one 
preferred solution.  This research was intended to provide the DM with a risk based 
decision tool to aid him in developing a workable solution for problems with high levels 
of uncertainty.   
It is assumed if manpower is increased, the worst case is that the ERM will 
remain the same.  Risk will never be increased with increases in manpower.  However, 
many changes to the model may affect the ERM.  The ERM is very sensitive to changes 
in the manpower risk factors.  This is a subjective measure and careful attention should 
be paid to ensure the factors are determined logically.  In addition to the subjectivity of 
the measure, an assumption was made that taking “staff” workers out of their normal jobs 
and placing them in traditional firefighting shift work will not increase the risk.  This 
assumption was made because the “staff” workers are trained firefighters; the time frame 
for analysis was relatively short, one day for the analysis and only 134 days if it had to be 
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sustained for the whole deployment, and the DM felt there was enough downtime on the 
job for the “staff” to perform their normal duties.  For the Aircraft category, staff workers 
begin to be rolled in at 70% manpower available level and are exhausted by the 60% 
manpower available level.  For the Structural and HAZMAT categories they are rolled in 
at 60% and exhausted by the 50% manpower level (Jones, 2007).  If this assumption 
proves false, the ERM could decline sharply.  The assumption was based on very sound 
logic, but it is something to continue to analyze and manage.  In addition to 
underestimating ERM, overestimating ERM will decrease the ERM, but may also 
unnecessarily use funds that could be better spent in other areas. 
 Another area where the model can be sensitive is change to the normal absence 
rate.  This is because increasing normal absences decreases the personnel per shift; this in 
turn can lead to failure to meet the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).  The 
DM based the manpower risk factors on those NFPA standards.  Therefore, increases in 
the normal absences can lead to increases in the manpower risk factors.  The model is 
very sensitive to those changes as previously discussed.  Part of the sensitivity to normal 
absences is caused by truncating the manpower levels.  The manpower may not be 
available at the 60% manpower level, but is available at the 62% manpower level.  The 
DM is very satisfied that 20% normal absence is a conservative estimate on the maximum 
value of normal absence for a deployment or a given day, but it is also possible to be too 
conservative and again consume resources needed elsewhere.   
While other factors affect the ERM, the ERM is less sensitive to these changes 
because of the large time frame the data were collected over.  Over three years of data 
and approximately 3,000 alarms were analyzed to determine the uncertainties.  Changes 
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to the total cost, loss of lives, and number of responses create little impact on ERM or λ 
because they are averaged over a large number of events.  In addition, because the 
Poisson distribution was used, changes in the time frame will not affect the likelihood 
distribution.  If only a small data population is available for analysis with this model, 
ERM may be more sensitive to changes in these areas. 
Discussion of Results 
 The primary goal of this research was to validate a methodology for a risk based 
decision tool.  The situation chosen to validate the decision tool was a potential future 
deployment at Dyess AFB.  This model proved operable for this representative case.  
Actual usable data was produced.  From the ERM, it appears that during a deployment, 
the Fire Chief would not see a significant drop in risk until after the 60% manpower level 
for a 24-hour shift.  The cost/benefit relationship added further support to this conclusion 
showing that, although there was not a large increase in ERM, there was a cost of about 
over $1,400 associated with an increase from the 60% to 70% manpower level.  This is 
especially true since the normal absence rate analyzed is considered conservative.  With 
normal absences being conservative, the DM can probably count on some of those 
firefighters being available for work.  If the extreme case happens, overtime can be used 
to fill the void.  In addition, mutual aid received was not considered in the model.  If the 
base has a mutual aid agreement with surrounding agencies, this could create a decrease 
in ERM.  However, the sensitivity analysis suggested that close attention should be paid 
to the manpower risk factors and they probably need to be managed and reanalyzed on a 
relatively frequent basis.  It is important to note that a 60% manpower level, assuming a 
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20% normal absence rate, may not restrict the FES flight from responding to Aircraft-Yes 
alarms with the 18-man team required by the NFPA (Jones, 2007)  
Summary 
 In this chapter a methodology to develop a risk based decision tool to assist USAF 
FES flights with manpower planning for short manning situations caused by deployments 
was analyzed.  The representative case to test the methodology was a potential Dyess 
AFB deployment.  The methodology worked as conceived and resulted in an operable 
decision tool that produced usable results.   The chapter included data collection, 
consequence aggregation, a risk model based on manpower, and a cost benefit analysis.  
Chapter 5 summarizes the results and addresses some the research questions stated in 
Chapter 1. 
 
 86 
V.  Conclusion 
Background 
 The purpose of this study was to create a risk based decision tool to assist in 
manpower level decisions for firefighting organizations.  The research focused on 
modeling risk in terms of manpower for United States Air Force (USAF) Fire and 
Emergency Services (FES) flights.  FES flights are dynamic organizations charged with 
preserving life and property from a variety of unpredictable emergencies.  Modeling the 
risk to an organization presented an enormous challenge.  In order to model the risk, this 
study had to draw from a wide range of risk assessment and decision analysis concepts.  
The first attempt at accomplishing this research was to model all of the responsibilities of 
FES flights.  FES flights proved to be too dynamic to make this model operable. 
 The methodology may be valid over a larger group of organizations, but the 
model had to be developed for a specific representative situation.  The situation decided 
on was a deployment at Dyess AFB in Texas.  The deployment situation was chosen 
because the USAF is in a time of very high operations tempo and deployments are 
common.  Many organizations have to deal with short manning situations, but manpower 
shortages are most evident in organizations responsible for public safety and the 
protection of multi-million dollar assets.   
 Even modeling this specific situation was a challenge, but a workable model was 
developed.  Once the workable model was developed, it performed very well.  The output 
was a series of pareto optimal graphs showing the risk to manpower and the cost/benefit 
relationships.  These graphs provide quantitative insight that can be quickly referenced by 
the decision maker (DM) in a short manning situation. 
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 One of the goals of the research was to create the methodology for application in 
all USAF FES flights and in the bigger picture all fire departments and potentilly all first 
responder organizations.  The model developed is very specific to Dyess AFB.  The 
methodology succeeded at representing the risk at Dyess AFB and was intended to be 
flexible enough to allow for use on other USAF installations.  Therefore, the 
methodology will allow for the modeling of different USAF FES flights.  In fact, risk 
scenario generation began with a list of responsibilities created specifically to represent 
the responsibilities of all USAF installations and deployments, which affect many, if not 
all, USAF installations.   
The methodology appears to be applicable to municipal fire departments, as well.  
Some obvious changes would have to be made in terms of deployments and the list of 
responsibilities, but otherwise, it would appear to be valid.  In bigger cities with many 
responses and multiple stations, or in organizations where personnel serve multiple roles 
(i.e. personnel are both firefighters and police officers), even more changes or 
assumptions would have to be made to apply this methodology.  The results show the 
methodology is a reliable framework for quantitatively analyzing manpower levels versus 
risk.  This research for this study did not explore other first responder organizations in 
enough depth to make to determine the applicability on other first responder 
organizations.  Therefore, the methodology is unproven on other first responder 
organizations.  However, the methodology does appear to be usable for making analytical 
manpower decisions in any organization where the risk to the public and property has a 
relationship to the manpower level  
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 The remainder of this chapter will explore four areas.  The first is to use the 
model to investigate the validity of some of the USAF assumptions and ideas that were 
discovered through research.  The second portion of this chapter will be 
recommendations.  The third section will be research strengths and limitations, and the 
final section presents ideas for future research. 
Analyzing USAF Assumptions 
 One Major Event Assumption 
 One USAF assumption with manpower is only one major structural, aircraft, or 
HAZMAT event will occur at a given time (AFI 32-2001, 1999).  This model did not 
prove this assumption valid or false.  The likelihood of an event is determined for one 24-
hour period and the model did not differentiate whether events were simultaneous or not.  
The model did allow for the possibility of simultaneous events.  However, the 
consequences were assumed independent and were not affected by the probability of 
simultaneous events.  Although the model itself did not differentiate there was a 
substantial data collection done at Dyess AFB. 
This research and past knowledge of Dyess AFB has uncovered three structural 
emergencies that could be considered major response (a kitchen fire, a utility shop fire, 
and a wildland fire), three HAZMAT emergencies (all JP-8 fuel spills with one involving 
serious injury), and two major aircraft emergencies.  None of these events occurred 
simultaneously.  The probability of having two “Yes” events (Aircraft, Structural, or 
HAZMAT) in a day is only 66%.  In addition, almost all fire chiefs that were consulted 
for this research indicate their installations have mutual aid agreements with the local 
municipalities.  Therefore, the assumption, although not a fact, is probably a safe 
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assumption for manpower.  However, it is not a safe assumption when calculating risk.  
There is a risk of it occurring and that needs to be accounted for in the risk analysis. 
 FES Flights Manpower is Determined by Aircraft Emergencies 
 The FES Reshaping Conference (2007) stated that the core FES manpower 
number of 55 firefighters is based on the number of firefighters needed to man the trucks 
for a certain level aircraft response.  This number of firefighters is multiplied by a 
manpower factor and this factor is supposed to account for normal absences, command 
and control, alarm shop personnel, deployments, and other staff positions.  However, 
Aircraft response alone does not dictate FES manpower, the USAF manning document 
(AFMS 44EF) allows for positive variances for installations with larger buildings and 
bomb ranges.  
 Is this a good way to man a FES flight?  The answer to that question can only be 
answered in terms of whether the factor does indeed account for all of those firefighting 
and “staff” positions.  If so than according to the analysis, it is a good way to determine 
manpower at Dyess AFB.  A true aircraft emergency requires that 18 firefighters respond, 
and according to the analysis, the consequences at Dyess AFB of a structural or 
HAZMAT emergency, do not increase until manpower falls below 12.  Therefore, if 
Dyess AFB is manned for an aircraft emergency in the manner described above, it should 
be adequately covered for all other emergency types.  However, assuming aircraft 
emergencies only is not an appropriate method to estimate risk. 
 Matrix Relating Manpower to Impact 
 Air Combat Command (ACC) developed a matrix relating manpower to impact 
(Kennedy, 2007).  This matrix, Table 1.1, relates a manpower percentage level to risk, 
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FES impact and emergency scene impact.  Based on this research, this matrix would be a 
very conservative estimate for Dyess AFB.  At the 70% manpower level, the ACC matrix 
reports critically manned.  This study determined at 70% manned, Dyess AFB FES flight 
was fully capable during a deployment.  The remaining manpower levels on Table 1.1 
appear to be equally as conservative. 
Strengths and Limitations of Research 
 One of the main strengths of this research is that it took a very dynamic and 
complicated problem and simplified it, but maintained an adequate level of accuracy.  
The results turned out as intended and they are easy to read and understand.  Another one 
of the strengths is the use the Poisson distribution.  Poisson distributions allow the model 
to be put in terms of any time frame desired.  It also allows for historical data, not random 
data, to influence the likelihood. 
 This research has a number of limitations.  One area of concern is in the 
consequences.  One limitation is the use of subjective data to calculate consequences.  
Historical data was used for the 100% manpower level, but the remaining manpower 
levels were calculated using the subjective manpower risk factors.  Compounding this 
concern is the fact that the model is most sensitive to this measure.  This makes the model 
susceptible to over- or under-estimating, either intentionally or unintentionally.  Another 
area of concern is the material consequences.  The only data available was data reportable 
by the Dyess FES flight.  Dyess AFB FES only reports damage from actual fires, in 
addition to that, they only report fire damage for fires they extinguish or have some other 
role in.  The non-reportable fire damage should be accounted for as FES risk, but it is not 
accounted for in the model.   
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 The methodology has limitations as well.  The first limitation is the likelihood of 
more than one alarm in a sub-category.  The Poisson distribution allows for this, but this 
model assumes the consequence is the same regardless of the number of alarms.  Another 
limitation is that the model assumes the consequences are the same, even if another 
emergency is occurring.  The model does not allow for the increase in consequences in 
one emergency due to the fact that FES manpower is responding to another.  The size of 
the model is a limitation.  The model has 12,800 potentially unique risk scenarios.  Using 
a spreadsheet model, these consequences can be arranged so there is very little data entry.  
However, there are still many places where errors can be introduced.  The final limitation 
is the use of a constructed unit.  A linear single dimension value function was used to 
normalize the consequences in terms of constructed unit.  This may make potential 
beneficiaries of the methodology more resistant to using it. 
Areas of Future Research 
 One area that needs future research is the development of the consequences.  To 
start, a method should be developed to make the manpower risk factors more objective, 
or completely replace them with an objective measure.  It would also be advantageous if 
consequences could be found that would allow for the formulation of a preferred solution.  
This was tried in this research with cost benefit analysis, but preferential independence 
between contractor cost and expected risk mitigation prohibited the use of an additive 
value function.  Being able to optimize the decision eliminates the need to explain 
constructed units.  The last idea for future research is to test and adapt the methodology 
to other FES flights or other first responder organizations.  
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Summary 
 FES flights are very diverse and very dynamic.  There were few questions that 
were not answered with “it depends,” making it very difficult to model.  In addition to the 
modeling being difficult, the software used to calculate the decision tree was not robust 
enough for the size of the model.  The software that was used only allowed up to 500 
total nodes.  The model was split to reduce the nodes and then exceeded the capacity of 
number of decision trees so all the formulas had to be hand entered into a spreadsheet.  
The software was used for the visuals, but the spreadsheet was used for the calculations.  
Using the spreadsheet for the calculations increased the speed of calculations and 
decreased the size on disk.  The programs offer nice features, but size is something to 
think about before committing to a modeling program.  
However, once the problem was able to be modeled, it performed great.  The 
expected risk mitigation, the cost/benefit relationship and the 20% normal absences all 
pointed to a range of values between 55% and 65% manpower level.  The sensitivity 
analysis revealed that the expected risk mitigation value was very sensitive to the 
manpower risk factors.  The model worked well and the results were clear and easy to 
understand. 
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Appendix A:  Categorized ACES-FD Response Data (1 Jan 2004 to 25 Jan 2007) 
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Appendix B:  ACES-FD HAZMAT Response Data 
 
 
 (Jones, 2007, Brown, 2007) 
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Appendix C:  20 Percent Normal Absence Consequence Data 
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Appendix D:  20 Percent Normal Single Consequence [v(XC)] Data 
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Appendix E:  Cost/Benefit Data 
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